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ABSTRACT
The Institutional Control o f NCAA
Division One Collegiate Athletics
by
Burton L. Easley
Dr. Anthony Saville, Examination Committee Chair
Professor o f Education
University o f Nevada. Las Vegas
The control o f collegiate athletics has been a matter o f concern since the earliest
days o f college sports competition. In 1952. the National Collegiate Athletic Association
instituted policies that included the ability to impose sanctions on colleges that violated
recruiting guidelines, eligibility requirements, and other rules.

Its lack of iny estigative

and policing resources, hoyvever. left the NC.AA with limited ability to enforce these
policies. As a result, the organization placed the responsibility for control o f institutional
athletics on the school itself and its chief executive officer based on the reasoning that
many problems involving violations o f regulations yvould be solved yyithout intery ention
by the NCAA if a school's administration is in control o f athletics.
Scandals surrounding intercollegiate athletics and the issuance of a number o f
citations by the NC.AA against Division I institutions for lack o f institutional control are
raising senous questions about the present status and effectiveness o f self-governance
and control o f collegiate athletics. The purpose o f this study was to determine the status
iii
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o f institutional control o f athletics programs at N C A A Division I colleges and
uni\ ersities by identify ing the le\ els and ways in which control was exercised and to
determine where problems with control lay This was done by surveying the athletics
directors and chief executive officers o f the 275 N C A A Division I colleges and
universities
The results o f the surv ey and the implications o f them are presented in this
document, also presented are recommendations for changes in policy, procedures, and
attitudes in order to improve the degree o f institutional control o f athletics at NCAA
Division I intercollegiate athletic institutions and suggestions for further study of the
topic.

IV

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

TABLE OF C O N TE N TS

A B STR A C T................................................................................................................................... iii
LIST OF T A B L E S ..................................................................................................................... vii
A C K N O W LE D G M EN TS

.......................................................................................................ix

CHAPTER 1: IN T R O D U C T IO N ......................................................................................... I
The Problem ......................................................................................................................1
Significance o f the S tu d y ............................................................................................... 3
Statement o f Purpose..................................................................................................... 5
Conceptual F ra m e w o rk ................................................................................................. 6
Elements to be Investigated...........................................................................................6
Methodology ...................................................................................................................7
Delimitations o f the S tu d y ............................................................................................. 8
Definition o f T e r m s ........................................................................................................8
Summary ........................................................................................................................ II
CHAPTER 2: H IS TO R IC A L V IE W OF G O V E R N A N C E & IN S TITU TIO N A L
CONTROL OF COLLEGE ATHLETICS IN T H E U N ITE D S T A T E S
12
Early History ................................................................................................................. 12
Student-Controlled Sports ......................................................................................... 13
Faculty and Alumni Control ....................................................................................... 18
The Brown C o n fe ren c e...............................................................................................21
The Growth o f Inter-institutional Associations........................................................24
The NCAA t National Collegiate Athletic Association) .........................................28
The Carnegie Foundation.....................................................................................
30
The Rules Enforcement Decision o f the N C A A ......................................................32
The College Football Association Challenge to the NC.AA .................................. 33
The Difficulty o f Institutional Control ..................................................................... 34
Commercialism and Winning at All C o s t .................................................................41
Presidential Efforts to Control A th le tic s ...................................................................47
Governing Boards ........................................................................................................51
The Faculty Athletics Representative ....................................................................... 53
Conference Efforts in Governance ............................................................................54
The .Amencan Council on Education ....................................................................... 56
Presidents’ Com m ission............................................................................................... 59

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The Knight C om m ission............................................................................................ o3
Summary ...................................................................................................................... 66
CHAPTERS; RESEARCH DESIGN A N D M ETHODOLOGY .................................. 68
Selection o f Population and Subjects ......................................................................68
Survey Questionnaires
............................................................................................ 68
Reliability o f the Surv ey Instrument ........................................................................ 69
Face Validity of the Surv ey Instrument ................................................................ 70
Content Validity o f the Surv ey Instrument............................................................... 70
The Pilot Study..............................................................................................................70
Data Collection............................................................................................................. 71
Data Analysis............................................................................................................. 72
CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION OF T H E R E S U L T S .......................................................... 74
Introduction..................................................................................................................74
The Governing Board................................................................................................... 75
The Athletics D irecto r.................................................................
79
The C hief Executive O f f ic e r ..................................................................................... 88
Financial & Operational P olicies.............................................................................. 93
Boosters & Alumni ................................................................................................. 102
Summary .................................................................................................................... 108
CHAPTER 5: S U M M A R Y OF FIN D IN G S A ND
R EC O M M EN D A TIO N S FOR FURTHER S T U D Y ......................................... 113
Introduction..............................................................................................................113
Im plications..............................................................................................................114
Recommendations..................................................................................................... 116
Recommendations for Further S tu d y ...................................................................... 118
APPEN DIX

I SURVEY FOR C H IE F EXEC U TIVE O F F IC E R S .....................

119

APPEN DIX II: SURVEY FOR A TH LE TIC S DIRECTO RS.......................................

125

APPEN DIX III: COVER LETTER TO C H IEF EXECUTIVE O F FIC E R S .................

132

APPEN DIX IV COVER LETTER T O ATHLETICS D IR E C T O R S ..........................

133

APPEN DIX V: FOLLOW-UP L E T T E R .........................................................................

134

R EFER EN C ES....................................................................................................................

135

V ITA

145

...................................................................................................................................

VI

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

LIST OF TABLES

Table I ; Mission Statement Concerning Role o f Athletics .............................................76
Table 2; Governing Board Support o f Presidential Authority ........................................ 77
Table 3: Governing Board Expectations Regarding Wins ...............................................77
Table 4: Extent o f Financial Support ..................................................................................78
Table 5; Support for Presidential Authority by Athletics D ire c to r..................................80
Table 6; Athletics Director's Expectations o f Coaches .................................................. 81
Table 7: Athletics Director’s Expectations o f Coaches ( According to CEO's i .............. 81
Table 8: Stability o f Athletics Director Position ..............................................................82
Table 9; Stability o f Football and Basketball Coaches Positions ................................... 82
Table 10; Stability o f Position o f Olympic Sport Coaches .................................................83
Table 11 : Performance Clauses for Football and Basketball Coaches ............................. 84
Table 13: Threats to the Control o f Athletics ...................................................................... 86
Table 14: Strategies to Establish Control .............................................................................87
Table 15: Threats to Control o f Athletics .............................................................................90
Table 16: Strategies to Establish Control .............................................................................92
Table 17: Admission Requirements for Athletes ............................................................... 95
Table 18; Role o f the Board .................................................................................................. 96
Table 19; Financial Support to the Athletics Department .................................................97
Table 20: Percentage o f Athletics Budget from Institutional or State Funds ................... 97
Table 21 : Monetary Support from External Foundations ............................................... 99
Table 22: Educational Programs for Student-Athletes ......................................................100
Table 23: Boosters and Alumni Support o f Presidential A u th o rity ................................ 103
Table 24: Monetary Support from External Athletics Foundations ...........................
106
Table 25: Funds Generated from Boosters and Alumni ................................................... 106
Table 26: Expectations o f Boosters and Alumni ..............................................................106
Table 27: Booster & Alumni Contributions .......................................................................107
Table 28 Boosters Expectations Regarding Coaches ..................................................... 108

V ll

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Acknowledgments

The wTiter wishes to express sincere thanks for the help and support o f his
chairman. Dr Anthony Saville. A special thanks to the members of his committee. Dr.
Carl Steinhoff, Dr. Teresa Jordan, and Dr. James Frey.
Without the patience, self-sacrifice, encouragement, and support o f the writer s
wife, Diana, and daughters. Tina and Lisa, this study would not have been possible. The
writer is also indebted to his parents. Dr. Burton L. Easley, Sr., and Martha Jean Easley,
for their support and encouragement.

VIII

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER I

IN TR O D U C TIO N

The Problem
On June 12, 1995, the cover o f Sports Illustrated carried the headline, "WTiy the
Univ ersity o f Miami Should Drop Football.” The accompanying article. "Broken Beyond
Repair." by Alexander W olff, took the form o f an open letter to the school's president.
Edward Foote II. urging him to eliminate the university's famous football program m
order to salvage the school’s reputation as a place o f higher learning. W olff cited
offenses on the part o f individual athletes that included disorderly conduct, shoplifting,
drunken dnving. burglary, arson, assault, and sexual battery
An earlier article which had appeared in the M iam i Herald o f May 18 had
reported that. "No fewer than one o f every seven scholarship play ers on last season's
team has been arrested.. ." According to Wolff, abuses were not limited to the athletes.
Problems involving employ ees included fraud with the Pell Grant Program, drug abuse,
drunken driving, and reckless dri\ ing.
With the National Collegiate .Athletic Association ( NCA.A i tagging the University
o f Miami with the charge o f lack o f institutional control, W o lff called on the school's
president to summon the courage to defy the board o f trustees, the alumni, and the
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boosters and shut down the football program. .As precedent. WoItTcited examples of
presidents o f other schools such as the University o f Chicago. University o f San
Francisco, and Tulane University who had already dropped major athletics programs.
The issue o f control of collegiate athletics is not a new one. It has been an
ongoing, persistent concern of college and university presidents at NCA.A member
institutions since the earliest day s o f college sports competition i ACE Report. 1952:
Cohen & March. 1974: Frey. 1982: Guttman. 1988: Hanford, 1976: Hardy& Berryman.
1982: Hart-Nibbrig. 1989: knight Commission. 1991: Rooney. 1980: Sack. 1982:
Sav age, 1929: Smith, 1988: Thelin. 1989. 1994). From the time when Yale and Harvard
first competed in the sport o f rowing in 1864. university presidents hav e struggled w ith
the issue of the control o f athletics (Guttman. 1978).
Criticism has also been ever present: it has pervaded college and university sports
since before the turn o f the century and continues today ( Andre & James. 1991: Farrell.
1989: Fleisher. 1992: Guttman. 1982: Hardy & Berry man. 1982: Hart-Nibbng &
Cottingham. 1989: Lawrence, 1987. Lucas & Smith. 1978: Wheeler. 1996).
.Administrators from around the country continue to question the relationship between
athletics and academics: some believe that the abuses created by the entertainment value
o f a successful athletics program have turned academic institutions into nothing less than
professional amusement centers (Frey. 1982: Funk. 1991: Lucas & Smith. 1978: Mallett
& Howard. 1992. Nelson. 1982: Smith. 1988: Thelin. 1989, 1994) Despite the
problems, howev er, many still feel that the benefits of intercollegiate athletics programs
outwemh the drawbacks as lone as cheatinu. uamblinu. and recruitment irreuulanties do
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not sacrifice the integrity o f the university (Andre & James. 1991: Guttman. 1988: Lucas
& Smith. 1978: Simon. 1985. 1991. Thelin. 1989»,
In the early 195(J's. the American Council on Education (.ACE), a large
association of colleges and universities, considered the possibility of de-emphasizing
athletics. The discussion was generated by the numerous scandals that tainted many o f
the athletic programs at that time (Farrell. 1989: Robert & Olson. 1989: Stem. 1979.
Thelin, 1994). Consequently , in 1952. the NC A.A. as the rule-making body o f
intercollegiate sport, instituted policies that included the ability to impose sanctions upon
colleges that violated recruiting guidelines, eligibility requirements, and other rules.
Unfortunately, N C A A attempts at controlling intercollegiate athletics have had
results that are mixed, at best. The primary reason for this is that the resources
designated for enforcement have been minimal. Without an adequate number o f
personnel to investigate possible infractions, the probability o f deterring over 900
NC.A.A members from violating NC.A.A rules has been limited (Chu, 1982).

Significance o f the Study
Because of its lack o f inv estigative and policing resources, the NC.A.A established
a set o f principles of gov ernance that placed the responsibility for control on the
institution and its chief operating officer. The organization's reasoning was that many of
the problems inv olv ing v iolations of regulations would be solved without intervention by
the NC.AA if a school’s administration is in control o f athletics (D. Taitt. NCA.A
Enforcement Office, personal communication, 1995 >. Many from outside o f the NC.A.A
hav e also called for stronuer control over intercolleuiate athletic ( Andre & James. 1991:
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Malien & Howard. l^Q]: Thelm. 1989: Sack. 1989,. The pnnciples o f msiitutional
control as prepared b\ the NC.A.A Committee on Infractions i |996i are:
I

The NC.AA rules applicable to each operation are readily available to
those persons involved in that operation

2.

.Appropriate forms are provided to persons involved in specific operations
to ensure that they w ill properly follow NC.AA rules.

3.

A procedure is established for timely communication among various
university offices regarding determinations that affect compliance with
NC.AA rules

4.

Meaningful compliance education programs are prov ided for personnel
engaged in athletics-related operations.

5

Informational and educational programs are established to inform
athletics boosters o f the limitations on their activ ities under NC.A.A rules
and of penalties that can anse against the institutions if the boosters are
responsible for rule v iolations

6.

Intbmiational and educational programs are established for studentathletes regarding he rules that they must follow.

7

An internal monitonng system is in place to ensure compliance with
NC.A.A rules.

8.

An external audit o f athletics compliance is undertaken at reasonable
intervals

9

The chief executive officer and other senior administrators make clear
that they demand compliance with NCAA rules and that they will not
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tolerate those who deliberately violate the rules or do so through gross
negligence
10

The institution and its staff members have a long history o f self-detectingself-reporting. and self-investigating o f all potential violations.

The NC.AA Enforcement Office started keeping records o f v iolations o f the
NC.A.A Rule Book on October 16. 1952. It has recorded 96 cases w hich hav e included
citations against schools for lack o f institutional control. Fifty-five o f these have
involved Division I institutions and have taken place just since 1980 ( NCA.A
Enforcement Summarv. 1995 ).
Scandals inv olving athletics have taken place at a number of colleges. These hav e
involved such infractions as altered transcripts, shadow courses requinng no attendance
by athletes, slush funds for athletics personnel, secret contracts, and the use o f
professionals posing as amateurs i Hardy & Berryman. 1982). These cases have raised
serious questions about the present status and effectiveness of self-governance and
institutional control o f collegiate athletics.

Statement of Purpose
The purpose o f this investigation was to determine the current status o f
institutional control of athletics programs at NCAA Division 1 colleges and univ ersities
by identifying the levels and the ways in which control was exercised and to determine
w here problems with control lie This was done through the use of a surv ey designed to
collect information pertaining to the individual elements and conditions that have been
determined to impact on self-governance.
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Conceptual Framework
The NC.AA is unable to police athletics b\ itself because of the limited resources
o f Its enforcement office: therefore, it must rely on each institution to police itself
.Accordingly , the NC.A.A Manual ( 1996-97) specifically states that it is the responsibility
o f each member institution to control its intercollegiate athletics program in compliance
w ith the rules and regulations o f the association.
The ultimate responsibility for institutional control is placed by the NCAA on the
school’s chief executn e officer. This is reasonable since a primary function o f any CEO
IS that o f control (Mintzberg. 1975): the objective of that control is to assure proper
performance in accordance with established plans (Flippo & Munsinger. 1978). Thus,
the NC.AA Manual ( 1996-97 ) states that it is a school’s chief executive officer who is
responsible for the administration o f all aspects of the athletics program, including
approval o f the budget and audit of all expenditures
The concept o f institutional control is o f primary importance to the NC.A.A’s
ability to regulate college sports due to its inability to police athletics itself. .According
to Dirk Taitt in the NC.AA Enforcement Office, many of the violations of NC.A.A rules
hav e come from schools that have not been in control of their athletics program. If a
school’s administration controls athletics, rather than the athletics department controlling
the institution. Taitt says, many o f the problems will be solved without intervention by
the NC.A.A i personal communication. 1995).

Elements to be Investigated
The institutional control o f athletics is complicated by the often conflicting goals
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7
and philosophies of students, coaches, faculty, administrators, alumni, and the general
public (Frey. 1982: Fisher. 1984» .Although the ultimate responsibility lies with a single
person, the CEO. control is inevitably impacted by other issues and by other parties and
entities both within and outside o f the university

Primary among these are the

institution’s governing board, its athletics director, its alumni and athletics boosters, and
ev en the financial and operational policies o f the school. V\'ith that in mind, the
following questions served as a basis for the collection and analy sis o f data;
1.

To what degree and with what strategies was control exercised by the
chief executive officer of the institution’’

2.

In what way s and to what extent was institutional control facilitated or
inhibited by the governing board o f the institution’’

3.

In what way s did financial and operational policies o f the institution
influence and affect control o f athletics ’

4

In what ways were athletics directors involved in the institution's control
of athletics?

5.

In what ways were the school's boosters and alumni affecting the
institution’s control o f athletics?

Methodology
.A questionnaire was dev eloped which was composed o f eight sections, the first
section requested demographic data while the remaining sections sought in-depth
descriptions of institutional control o f indiv idual athletics programs. The combination o f
yes-and-no questions. Likert-scale questions, and open-ended questions relating to
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s
institutional control served as a basis for qualitative measures to analyze the existence of
institutional control o f athletics programs The population selected to receive the survey
instrument consisted o f the chief executive officer and the athletics director at NCAA
Div ision 1 institutions.

Delimitations o f the Study
This study was limited to the chief executive officer and the athletics director of
each o f the 275 NC.AA Division 1 colleges and universities listed in the 1996 97 National
Directory o f College .Athletics Not included in the study were those institutions in
NCAA Divisions II and III. junior colleges, and N A IA institutions which set different
standards. Faculty .Athletics Representatives were not included in the survey. No
attempt was made to ensure that the controls claimed by the chief executiv e officers and
the athletics directors actually existed.

Definition o f Terms
Athletics Advisorv Board: A board which has either controlling or advisory status
o f intercollegiate athletics at each member institution. This ty pe o f board with its
responsibility for advising or establishing athletics policies and making policy decisions
IS not required by the NC.A.A.
.Athletics Certification-External Peer Review : .A program o f w hich the central
purpose is to validate the fundamental integrity o f the athletics programs o f each member
institution through a verified and evaluated institutional self-study. The cenification
program is carefully designed with peer rev iewers who are external to the institution
under e.xaniination and who verify that the self-study process is characterized by
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campus-wide panicipation and that the self-study report reflects accurately the operation
o f the athletics program
Authority Tlie capacity to ev oke compliance in others on the basis o f formal
position and o f any psy chological inducements, rewards, or sanctions that may
accompany formal power (Presthus. I9&2. p 123)
C hief Executive Officer (CEO ): The administrator designated to be responsible
for all that transpires within the institution. A member institution's chief executive
officer has ultimate responsibility and final authority for the conduct o f the
intercollegiate athletics program and the actions o f any board in control o f that program
Faculty Athletics Representative: An individual designated by the institution who
must be a member of the institution’s faculty or an administrator who holds faculty rank
but who does not hold an administrative or coaching position in the athletics department.
Duties o f the faculty athletics representative are determined by the institution.
Governance: Schenkel (1971) defines governance as the process of decision
making, the designation o f participants in this process, the structure that relates these
indiv iduals to one another, the effort that is or should be made to ensure that decisions
are carried out. and the assessment of the results that are achieved as a consequence o f
those decisions. Corson ( 1975 ) adds that gov ernance describes the process o f deciding
and of seeing to it that the decisions are executed. Fry er and Lov as ( 199ü) state that
gov emance
comprises the institution’s structures and processes for decision making and the
communication related to those structures and processes. The definition of The Carnegie
Foundation for the .Adv ancement o f Teachinu ( 1982) includes not onlv the formal
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10
arrangements by which colleges and universities carry on their work, but also the
informal procedures by which standards are maintained. They also include in their
definition those forces bey ond the campus that shape the policies o f higher education and
to which the academy must ultimately respond.
Gov erning Board The entity w hose function is to act as the guardian o f the
charter o f an institution and to act as the body in which ultimate authority over the
institution is vested (Schenkel, 1971 ).
Institutional Control: The control and responsibility for the conduct o f
intercollegiate athletics that is exercised by the institution itself and by the conference, if
any. of which it is a member: it is constituted o f administrative control or faculty control
or a combination o f the two ( NCA.A Manual. 1994-95).
National Colleuiate .Athletic Association (N C A A i: A pnvate. non-profit
association organized in 1905. consisting o f approximately 903 active member
institutions. Membership is open to four-year institutions which meet specified
academic standards. The NCAA operates under a constitution and by -laws adopted by
the membership and subject to amendment by the membership at annual conv entions
Headquartered in Shawnee Mission, Kansas, it employs a professional staff o f about 80
w ho execute NCAA policy under the superv ision of an executiv e director ( Greene.
1984).
NC.A.A Div ision l-.A: One o f three divisions into which NCAA institutions are
grouped depending on stadium size, number o f sports offered, average attendance,
scholarships available, and other specifications. Division l-.A includes about 275 larger
institutions.
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II
Power McGrath ( 1971 ). in Power and Authority. stated that power refers to the
ability o f various individuals and groups in the academic community to control the
policy-making processes through specifically vested or delegated authority or through
influence acquired by mere force o f circumstance i p 187 1. Fisher 1 1984 1 concluded that
power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to
carry out his own will despite resistence. regardless o f the basis on which this probability
rests" ( p. 28). Bierstadt (1966) said that power is the ability to employ force while
Kanter ( 1996» said simply that power is the ability to get things done ( 1996, p. 2U).

Summary
Relevant literature is reviewed in the next chapter: the third chapter contains
information about the methodology used for this study including questionnaire
dev elopment and methods o f data analysis. Surv ey results are reported in the fourth
chapter, and conclusions and recommendations for future research are formulated in the
last chapter.
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CHAPTER 2

H ISTO RICA L V IE W OF G O VER N A N C E & IN S TITU TIO N A L CONTROL
O F COLLEGE A TH LETICS IN TH E UNITED STATES

Early History
Collegiate athletics appeared in the early nineteenth centur\ as unorganized
student acti\ities which were not considered to be a meaningful part o f campus life
(Hardy & Berryman. 1982. Lewis. 197Ua: Lucas & Smith. 1978» These extracurricular
activities were bom out o f the students’ need for something to reliev e the monotony and
dullness o f their school work I Chapman 1978: Cutting, 1871: Smith. 1988». Nothing
existed in the way o f structured control by students, and. although some rough and
Mgorous activities drew the attention o f college authorities, the games were not subject
to university leadership ( Chu. 1982: Fleisher. 1992: Forum. 1894: Hardy & Berryman.
1982 ». In addition, no rules or regulations had been created for the games ( Falla. 1981:
Nelson. 1982 ». As a result, it was quite common for a football player, for instance, to
compete in two or three different games representing different collegiate teams dunng a
single weekend I Falla. 1981: Farrell. 1989: Fleisher. 1992: Lucas & Smith. 1978:
Roonev. 1980: Slauuhter. 1989».

12
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13
Student-Controlled Sports
B\ the late nineteenth century. sports had become more accepted as an intramural
activ ity connected to the university i kett, 1977 >. Student-run organizations and the
students themselves took responsibility for the governance o f these early college spons
(Andre & James. 1991: Baker. 1982. Byers. 1995: Fleisher. 1992: G o ff 1988: Guttman.
1982. 1991. Hardy & Berry man. 1982. Lawrence. 1987: Nelson. 1982: Sage. W9ü:
Slaughter, 1989). The missions o f the student organizations which controlled sports were
to sponsor and conduct championship competitions, to establish play ing rules, and to
determine eligibility cntena (Hardy & Berry man ». Student athletic associations also
provided financial assistance and moral support for college athletes (Smith. 1988).
Because these student governing bodies were usually sport-specific, regulations
differed from sport to sport ( Nelson. 1982: Smith. 1988) .Also, since these organizations
were operated by volunteers, the inherent turnover made them short-lived ( Hardy &
Berryman. 1982: Nelson i The lack o f uniform rules and the inconsistency o f leadership
due to turnov er resulted in a call for more controlled adult superv ision by univ ersity
leadership iChu. 1982: Nelson).
Eventually the athletic associations encompassed all sports in the school ( Smith.
19 8 8 1. Harvard's athletic association was organized in 1874 and was followed by ones at
Princeton. Rutgers, and Michigan in 1876. As the mov ement spread southward and
westward, associations were established at Missouri in 1886. at Duke in 1887. at
Stant'ord in 1891. and at Oregon in 1893 ( Smith).
The first intercollegiate contest was a crew race between Harvard and \ ale.
taking place at Lake Winnepeasaukee in New Hampshire, on .August 3, 1852 (.Andre &
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James. 1991: Guttman. 1988; Hardy & Berry man. 1982: Hart-Nibbrig. 1989: Lawrence.
1987; Lewis. 1967: Lucas & Smith. 1978: Noverr. 1983. Rooney. 1980: Sage. 199(j:
Smith. 1988: WTtiton. 1852) The Yale faculty banned contests for the next two years
I Lucas & Smith ). By the second boat race in 1855. the need for some form o f control
and governance became an issue for the first time (Lewis, 1967: Lucas & Smith. 1978.
Sage. 1990. Savage, 1929. Smith, 1988, Stem. 1979). Vale believed that because the
Harvard coxswain had graduated, he should not be eligible to compete in the race.
However, because the contest was organized completely by students and had no
formulated rules nor eligibility standards. Yale had no one appeal to (Hardy &
Berryman. 1982: Lucas & Smith, 1978: Savage, 1929; Stem. 1979 )
Because each college had its own rules goveming athletics, the first
intercollegiate event pointed out. according to Hardy and Berryman ( 1982 ). that the
reasons for gov emance are the needs for rules o f play, eligibility o f play ers, and
recognition of a champion. Beginning with the collegiate event between Harv ard and
\'ale. conflicts arose when the regulations of one college gave it an athletic advantage
over another (Smith. 1988).
It was from this impetus that the first intercollegiate goveming body emerged at a
meeting in New Haven, and the College Union Regatta o f Brown. Harv ard. Tnnity.
Columbia . Dartmouth and Yale was formed in 1858 ( Guttman. 1988: Hardy &
Berry man. 1982. Lucas & Smith, 1978). From this meeting a set o f rules gov eming
future races between the institutions was agreed upon ( Hardy & Berryman. 1982: Sage.
1990)
Early athletics were often carried out over the objections o f faculty who saw sport
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as distracting from the real work of the college ( Davenport. 1985. Thelm. 1989).
Indeed, the game o f football in the early twentieth century had evolved into a v iolent
game with injury and even death becoming commonplace i Falla. 1981 : Farrell, 1989;
Fleisher. 1992: Slaughter. 1989) The first intercollegiate football game was played on
November 6th, 1869, between Princeton and Rutgers at Rutgers field in New Brunswick,
New Jersey ( Falla. 1981: Farrell. 1989. Funk. 1991: Lawrence, 1987. Nov err. 1983:
Rooney . 1980: Sage. 1990: Slaughter. 1989: Thelm. 1989).
The intercollegiate sport o f football highlighted the difficulty o f student
gov emance. In 1873. representatives o f teams from Princeton. Rutgers. Yale and
Columbia agreed to play the game o f football like soccer {Falla. 1981: Fleisher. 1992:
Lucas & Smith. 1978: Smith. 1988). Harv ard, w hich had not attended the meeting in
w hich this agreement was reached, decided to play the game in the rugby sty le o f play
and became isolated from the other schools ( Falla. 1981: Fleisher. 1992: Lucas & Smith.
1978) However, after Harvard played a rugby style rules game with Mcgill University o f
Montreal, Canada on May 14th. 1874. a group o f spectating Pnnceton students
encouraged a meeting between Princeton, Harvard. Yale and Columbia recommending
the adoption o f this new style
The subsequent meeting on November 23. 1876. at the Maced Hotel in
Springfield. Massachusetts, resulted in the formation o f the Intercollegiate Football
.Association (Baker. 1982: Falla. 1981. Fleisher, 1992: Guttman. 1978: Hardy &
Berryman. 1982: Han-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1989: Lawrence. 1987: Never. 1983:
Rooney. I98U. Smith. 1988). Yale, however, refused to join the student-run
Intercolleuiate Football Association It took three vears before Yale was broiuiht into the
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organization b\ the persuasions of its football captain. Walter Camp (Falla. 19811.
The organization succeeded in adopting 0 1 rules, only two o f w hich concerned
safety (Florrow. 1982: Lawrence. 1987i. Unfortunately, brutality intensified under the
new Intercollegiate Football .Association (Smith. 1988). As football became more
popular, the violence on the field escalated (Falla. 1981 ) By 1884, football had become
so violent that the football team at Harvard was ordered to disband. .Army and Navy
discontinued their series the same year due to v iolence on the field ( Falla, 1981: Smith.
1988).
Following the season o f 1887. the Intercollegiate Football .Association passed a
radical rule that nearly assured mass plays and increased charges o f brutality (Smith.
1988 ) The association, under the leadership o f Walter Camp o f Yale, ruled that tackling
below the waist to the knees would be allowed for the first time. The Univ ersity of
Pennsy lvania and Wesleyan withdrew from the association because they opposed the
new mass play and eligibility rules (Lawrence, 1987). Harvard and Columbia withdrew
m 1889 over a dispute inv olving the eligibility o f players ( Falla. 19 8 1. Lawrence. 1987:
Smith, 1988). In 1894. with only Yale and Princeton remaining in the organization, the
Intercollegiate Football Association disbanded ( Fleisher. 1992. Lawrence. 1987)
In 1894, the University Athletic Club o f New York attempted to fill the void and
asked Harvard. Yale. Pnnceton. and Penn to form a new rules committee (Falla, 1981.
Fleisher. 1992. Lawrence. 1982: Stagg, 1946). W alter Camp o f Yale was made secretary
and the organization instituted safer rules eliminating mass momentum plays (Smith.
1988)

Howev er, the new rules committee proved helpless in eliminating interschool

squabbling and the brutality in football iFalla, 1981: Fleisher, 1992). .After a violent
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game between Harvard and ^ ale. Harv ard split from Yale again and joined Penn and
Comell to form their own rules-making body (Lawrence. 1987. Smith, 19 8 8 1. The
eastern schools came under fire at this time from .Amos Alonzo Stagg. athletics director
o f the University of Chicago, for not creating one set o f rules (Smith. 1988).
In 1895. sensing that Stagg and other Big Ten schools might create another set of
rules goveming football, the large schools in the east again formed a rules-making body
called the Football Rules Committee (Fleisher. 1992). Writh the Football Rules
Committee, an athletic association became alumni controlled for the first time (Smith.
1988 ). Unfortunately. to pass a rule or to change an existing rule, all participants had to
agree (Fleisher. 1992). Because schools which benefitted from violent tactics on the
field could use a veto to overturn any rule that would adversely affect their ability to use
these techniques, the Football Rules Committee also failed in quelling the level o f
violence in college sports ( Fleisher. 1992: Smith. 1988).
Intercollegiate sports during the late ISOO's was developed almost exclusively by
student leadership ( Lucas & Smith. 1978: Sage. 1990 ). Despite the importance o f the
student athletic associations, it was still the task o f the individual sport's captain to solve
problems and ensure the continuance of the sports (Lucas & Smith. 1978: Smith. 1988).
Flovvever. student mismanagement, interschool squabbling, and v iolence and bmtality on
the field, in conjunction with a growing popularity o f campus sports ev entually led to the
American college taking its students’ athletic activ ities within its formal control and
financial structure ( Chu. 1982 ). Against the backdrop o f interschool squabbling and
violence m sport, organizational initiatives began to emerge (Fleisher. 1992).
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Faculty and Alumni Control
The record o f faculty govemance. according to Thelm ( 1994». has been weak.
Traditionally adv isory rather than regulatory , separately incorporated athletics
associations alway s precluded faculty ov ersight Lawrence ( 1987 »felt that faculty
purposefully kept aloof from athletic issues and that this lack o f faculty influence
partially explains the abuses that marred the early period o f intercollegiate football.
.At the time athletic departments were forming, college presidents were in tune
with matenalism and took the approach that athletics advertised the university and
directly correlated with increased enrollment (Thelm. 1989). They became active
marketing agents for athletics, attending games, speaking to v ictonous teams, and
soliciting funds from alumni and boards o f trustees, w hile the institutions began to
prov ide money for teams, absorb their debts, and grant scholarships. In addition, they
often sided against the faculty regarding the issue o f the development o f athletics (Gilley
& Hickey . 1986).
Dunng the late ISOO's. faculty and alumni sought increased participation in the
govemance o f athletics as student control declined (Hardy & Berryman. 1982. Slaughter,
1989). Administrators, however, felt that a campus-controlled program would pose
fewer administrative problems than would a program operated by ofT-campus groups
including alumni and politically onented interests (Nelson, 1982: Sage. 199u).
Eventually the faculty attempted to take the student-run athletic programs and place them
under what they believed to be sounder educational control ( Lucas & Smith, 1978). As
educators began to accept athletics as an integral part o f collegiate life, if not actually a
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part of the curriculum, they began to feel that they should exert greater control over its
negative aspects
The first faculty athletic committees were formed at Princeton Univ ersity in 1881
and at Harv ard in 1882 with the purpose o f holding in check the excesses o f athletics and
to veto those aspects o f sports that were deemed harmful ( Hardy & Berry man. 1982.
Lucas & Smith, 1978. Sargent. 1910: Smith. 1988) The Harv ard committee soon
stopped competition against professional teams and also forbid the hiring o f professional
coaches The first action o f the Princeton committee was to propose a list o f regulations
emphasizing the time and place o f contests. The Princeton faculty. keeping a close
watch over its athletic committee, continued to add responsibilities to the committee's
regulatory functions (Smith. 1988).
Faculties everywhere by the end o f the century had formed athletic committees in
an attempt to prevent football and other sports from encroaching upon academic
interests. The faculty committees were specifically concerned with abuses related to
athletics including: ta) growing professionalism including the practices o f hiring coaches
and recruiting athletes. (b i increasing size and management o f finances, (c) lack of
sponsmanship. ( d ) glontlcaiion of athletics over academics, and (e) derivative evils such
as drunkenness and gambling i Hardy & Berryman. 1982: Smith. 1988)
.According to Smith ( 1988), friction dev eloped between the faculty committee and
the students at Harv ard over the control o f athletics when the committee dismissed the
successful, paid crew coach. William Bancroft, in 1884 The committee pressured the
editorial stafT o f the student newspaper into not publishing negativ e letters o f former
crew captains regarding the incident. This discord between faculty and students spilled
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over into football as the faculty committee criticized the sport as being brutal and
extremely dangerous. The entire faculty at Harvard concurred with the committee when
it suggested to the president that football be prohibited. Faculty complained that the
number o f athletic contests disturbed serious academic work: they objected to the
ungentlemanly behav ior and the unhealthy moral influences o f big city games. They
protested against the brutality and the resulting injuries, against the use financial
inducements to attend college, and against the waste and extravagance taking place under
student management.
As Harv ard's students and alumni became increasingly critical o f the faculty
committee. President Elliot decided to form a new committee that included both students
and alumni as well as faculty (Smith, 1988). The new committee recommended a
resumption o f the sport of football the following year.
Harvard was not the only school to have problems with student-controlled spons
The president o f Nonhvvestem vvTote that many students "seemed to think that the
university was meddling with matters that did not properly come with its jurisdiction"
( Smith. 1988, p. 131). Bun W ilder. a professor at Cornell, felt that Cornell should be
the first institution to issue a "declaration of independence from the existing
athletocracv" ( Nonhvvestem University President's Annual Repon. 1895-96. p. 5. Smith.
1988. p. 132 ). Despite this view , with the growth o f athletics, it became increasingly
difficult for even an entire faculty to attempt to control athletics ( Lucas & Smith. 1978 ).
The alumni, even before they gained an official voice on many of the college
athletic committees as they had at Harvard, had acquired some control over a number of
athletics programs, they often assisted coaches and the expense of running a program
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often required alumni financial help as well ( Lucas & Smith. 1978). Their additional
involvement ot serv ing on athletic committees would, they claimed, establish continuity
and would compensate for the inexperience of the students ( Hardy & Berry man. 1982:
Lewis. 1965)
In reality , the financial support brought by alumni often translated into alumni
governance) Schenkel. 1971: Smith. 1988). .At Dartmouth College in 1892. for example,
the Board o f Trustees placed an unsuccessful athletics department under the control o f an
alumni athletic committee. Successful teams followed this move and, despite some
attempts, the faculty at Dartmouth were unsuccessful in regaining control.
By the 1900 s, both students and faculties had seen their powers diminish (Hardy
& Berryman. 1982: Sage. 1990: Smith. 1988). The loss o f faculty control and the
emergence o f alumni control was typical, according to Walter Schenkel (1971). o f the
American univ ersity at the turn o f the century

This was due in part to faculty lack o f

interest and also to the emergence o f powerful trustees and alumni. As students had lost
their freedom to manage athletic contests w ithout interference from faculty and others,
indiv idual colleges increasingly lost control o f athletics to outside forces. The mov ement
toward inter-institutional control had begun.

The Brown Conference
When the student-controlled, interschool associations failed to create a uniform
standard o f rules and to solve the problem o f v iolence in sport, a meeting was planned to
discuss these issues. A group made up o f faculty , alumni, and undergraduate
representativ es from seven schools met in Prov idence. Rhode Island, on February 18.
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! 898 ( Smith. 1988 ). .At the meeting, referred to as the Brown Conference, the group
appointed a standing committee made up o f faculty members to continue the work begun
at the conference. Ov er the next few months, this committee created a strongly worded
report calling for cooperative action to cure the ev ils o f intercollegiate sports. The repon
included guidelines for intercollegiate athletics that were not accepted immediately. but
which were all eventually affirmed, one by one. over the years These initial guidelines
stated that;
( 11

Each institution should form an athletic committee w ith faculty
representation;

(2 )

The athletic committee would approve all coaches, trainers, captains, and
team managers;

13

)

No athletic competition would take place without athletic committee
approval:

(4 1

.Any student participation in more than one sport would require athletic
committee approval:

(5 1

The athletic committee would ensure that all athletes were bona tide
members o f the institution ( Smith, 1988. p. 140)

In ensunng that only bona tide members o f an institution competed in
intercollegiate athletics, the Brown Conference made an early attempt at establishing
eligibility guidelines Qualifications for eligibility required that:
(a )

Only students in good academic standing would be eligible to participate

Ib)

Special or part-time students could not participate until they had attended
colleue for one vear.
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(c I

Students deficient in studies in one univ ersity department could not
participate in athletics if they transferred to another department in the
same university .

id)

No student admitted without passing the university entrance examination
or by merely conv incing gov erning authorities that he was capable of
doing a full year's work would be eligible for athletics.

<e)

Students should be allowed only four years o f eligibility.

( f)

Only freshmen would be allowed to participate on freshman teams

(g)

No freshman could participate on both the freshman and varsity teams
( Smith 1988. p

143).

Smith (1988) also reported that besides establishing general guidelines o f play
and eligibility. the committee set guidelines for practices, contests, and amateur status
For practice, the committee recommended that teams were not to practice during college
vacations except for the ten days prior to the opening o f the fall term: all contests were to
be held on college grounds: and students of the competing colleges were to be given
preference in the allotment o f seats at contests. In regard to amateur status, the
committee proposed that no student could participate in athletics if he had previously
played for money , all contests were to be held on college grounds, and no student would
be eligible for athletics i f he receiv ed board free at special dining facilities for athletes or
i f he owed money for training table meals.
Essentially. the faculty-controlled committee wanted to keep athletics from
interfenng with the mental and moral training o f the students i Smith. 1988 ) Flovvever.
this did not sit well either with students or with some faculty members. Students enjoyed
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the growing popularity of intercollegiate sports: at the same time, alumni, college towns
and communities, and some faculty members liked watching the events.
The Brown Conference, though well intentioned. was derailed by the reluctance
o f schools, especially ^'ale. to commit the direction o f athletics programs to the influence
o f an mterschool committee dominated by faculty (Smith, 1988: Thelin, 1994). Vale.
Harvard, and Princeton resisted reform: the establishment guarded its territory jealously
and av oided integration o f academics and athletics (Thelin. 1994). Institutional
autonomy was the norm among the college athletics establishment.
In spite of the fact that the guidelines which resulted from the Brown Conference
were ridiculed at the time and that they were not accepted by the majority of colleges,
many o f the regulations still exist in intercollegiate sports. For instance, restrictions on
practice, definition o f and requirement for amateur status, and many o f the eligibility
standards in some form still continue in modem day collegiate sports.

The Growth o f Inter-institutional Associations
The expansion of collegiate athletics was so great after 1880 and the rules
involving play were so varied that it soon became apparent that inter-institutional
controlling agencies were needed for their regulation and supervision (Sage. 1990). As
early as 1883, associations of colleges and univ ersities conducting athletics programs
w ere being formed in order to create consistent rules and regulations o f gov emance
among them (Guttman. 1978: Hardy & Berryman. 1982). Indeed, according to Thelm
( 19 9 4 1, the conference was the crucial collective unit for instilling standards in college
sports
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Conferences o f colleges were formed to standardize athletic procedures among
schools m one geographic area usually with similar enrollments, academic requirements,
and financial standings (Sage. 1990). These conferences ordinarily set standards, made
rules and regulations concerning athletic eligibility, and drew up playing schedules
Smith ( 1988» listed three early attempts at the inter-institutional control o f
athletics. The first attempt was in 1882. when President Eliot o f Harvard invited the
faculty of other schools to "prohibit your baseball nine from play ing with professionals
and secondly to limit the number o f matches" (p. 13o ». The second attempt was when
Harvard in 1883 invited faculty representatives from eight colleges — Yale, Harvard.
Princeton. Columbia. Penn. Trinity . Wesleyan, and Williams — to meet in New York
City to discuss mutual resolutions to the athletic problem.
Four resolutions were passed by this second group; they were; ( a »no professional
athlete should be employed as a coach o f any college team: (bi no college team should
play against a non-college team and games should be contested only on the home
grounds of one o f the colleges: (c) athletes were to be limited to four years o f athletic
participation, and (di each college should set up a faculty athletic committee to approve
rules and regulations and the colleges which accepted the resolutions would compete
only against others who did the same (Smith. 1988. p. 1371.
Despite this attempt at controlling college athletics, the members failed to ratify
these resolutions A concern, primarily held by Yale, was still prevalent about taking
complete control o f student activities (Hardy & Berryman. 1982). Consequently,
individual colleges went back to their own rules regarding eligibility , the participation o f
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professionals, and the hiring o f professional coaches ( Sargent, I9IU : Smith. 1988:
\ oung. 1886 1.
The last o f the three early attempts at the inter-institutional control o f athletics
came m 1886 when President McCosh o f Princeton proposed that Harv ard again attempt
to organize the football-playing schools Harv ard said they would organize the meeting
only i f Yale attended. Because Yale refused to attend. President McCosh s proposal died
(Smith. 1988).
By the 1890 s. stronger faculty-run inter-athletic associations became more
prominent. The Southern Intercollegiate Athletic Conference was founded in 1894
( Hardy & Berryman, 1982: Thelin. 1994). The following year, the Intercollegiate
Conference o f Faculty Representatives (The Big-Ten) was formed, introducing faculty
control o f athletics (Hardy & Berryman. 1982: Lawrence, 1987. Slaughter. 1989: Thelin.
1994 ) Its rules outlawed participation in a collegiate sport by persons who had taken
part in any athletic contest in which money prizes were offered.
On February 18. 1898. faculty, alumni, and student representatives of the
present-day Iv y League schools, except for Yale, met in a joint attempt to solve
athletic-related issues ( Hardy & Berry man, 1982). Over the next few years, associations
that eventually formed the Big Ten. Ivy League. Northwest Conference. Big Eight. Rocky
Mountain Faculty Athletic Conference, and PAC Ten were established by the faculties o f
the existing schools i Fisher. 1916: Hardy & Berryman. 1982: Needham. 19U5. Powell.
1964: Savage. 1929: Stagg. 1946: Thelin, 1994). These associations or conferences
differed from the student groups in that they controlled a number o f spons withm a
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school: they also established guidelines that were ratified b\ all participants for the first
time.
These organizations are judged to be a significant development in the evolution
of athletic governance due to their insistence on faculty control and their acceptance o f
eligibility in terms o f educational standards ( Hardy & Berryman. 1982: Lawrence, 1987:
Powell. 1964: Stagg, 1946: Thelin, 1994). Nevertheless, as Guttman ( 1978) pointed out.
the new conferences and associations were not able to solve the problems of govemance
The central reason was that they had no way o f making educational goals supersede the
goals o f v ictory and prestige for all institutions. Violations o f rules and regulations
continued.
Between I89u and 1905. different intercollegiate organizations created a variety
of rules committees, causing a great deal o f confusion among teams that often had to
learn two or more sets o f rules to play the game of football ( Lawrence. 19871.
Nevertheless, according to Thelin ( 1994), these organizations were the crucial collective
unit for instilling standards in college sports: these standards included adopting
restrictions on athletic scholarships, standardizing schedules to limit the numbers o f
games and practices, agreeing on recruiting practices, including faculty representatives
in conference discussion and govemance. regulating player eligibility. and
professionalizing athletic administration. Despite these effons. the new conferences and
associations were not able to solve the problems of govemance. However, by the tum o f
the century, both detractors and supporters o f intercollegiate sports had adopted the
posture that proper gov emance and regulation were necessary "to improve, reform, or

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

28
salvage the athletic pastimes which, like a weed, could neither be left alone nor
completely be eradicated" ( Hardy & Berry man. 1982. p. 16).

The NC.AA (National Collegiate Athletic .Association)
The lack o f adherence to existing rules and govemance nearly caused the death of
intercollegiate sports. After a tough and brutal football game w ith Yale in 1905. Harv ard
dropped the sport o f football because it had ev olv ed into a ruthless contest where players
were being crippled or even killed (Guttman, 1978, 1982: Hart-Nibbrig. 1989: Lawrence.
1987 ). U S. President Teddy Roosevelt personally intervened to save the game by calling
a number o f college presidents to the White House on October 9. 1905. and pleading
with them not to drop football.
Responding to the urging of President Roosevelt, a number o f colleges
representing intercollegiate football met in Philadelphia to discuss the issue o f keeping or
reforming the game, but nothing happened There was strong resistence to giving up
individual institutional autonomy over college sports in favor o f greater control and the
collective good ( Fleisher. 1992. Smith. 1988). Following the inaction which resulted
from this attempt to reform football. Henry M. McCracken, chancellor o f New York
University, called a special meeting of the football-playing colleges in the nation (Falla.
1981: Fleisher. 1992: Guttman. 1988: Lapchick. 1989: Lawrence. 1987. Lucas & Smith.
1978: Never. 1983: Smith. 1988). The delegates o f thirteen eastem colleges attended the
meeting in New York City on December 9. 1905 at the Murray Hill Hotel. The group
eventually decided to reform rather than to eliminate the sport. The group also
established the organization that ultimately became the present-day gov eming body of
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intercollegiate sports, the National Collegiate Athletic Association — the NCAA
( Den linger & Shapiro. 1975. Falla. 1981. Never. 1983. Sage. 1986. Slaughter, 1989.
Tow. 1982). Eventually, the NC.AA. under the direction o f Captain Palmer Pierce o f
West Point, succeeded in combining its rules-making body with the old committee
dominated by Walter Camp o f Yale i Falla. 1981: Smith, 1988).
The initial constitution o f the NC.AA stated its chief objective to be "the
regulation and superv ision o f college athletics throughout the United States, in order that
the athletic activ ities in the colleges and universities may be maintained on an ethical
plane in keeping with the dignity and high purposes o f education" i lA A U S Proceedings.
1906. p. 29 ). Despite its idealistic purpose, the NCAA was not successful at first in
attracting the most prestigious institutions to athletic competitions. Harv ard. Yale.
Pnnceton, and a number o f other major institutions refused to join the association,
according to Smith (1988) and Thelm ( 1994). These major institutions were hesitant to
see another group usurp the power which they had traditionally held In addition, the
concept o f the basic autonomy of each institution w as still very strong in .Amencan
higher education.
Thelm ( 1994) stated that the reform impulse was slow and weak because the
young NC.AA was a "ruling body lacking power and prestige" (p. 21). According to
Smith ( 1988). the real importance o f the NC.A.A in its beginning was not that it solved
problems — except for creating a uniform set o f playing rules for vanous sports — but
that It created a forum for discussing them (p. 208)
Originally designed to control the violence o f football, the NCA A ev entually
expanded its role to govemance o f all elements o f intercollegiate sports, from the
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standardization o f rules o f play and eligibility o f its athletes lo the functions o f
enforcement and punishment. According to Stem ( 1979). there were a number o f
reasons that the NCA.A grew from a loose confederation into the pnmary governing
organization for intercollegiate sport. The growing number of institutions committed to
intercollegiate sports developed the need for standardizing rules, communication, and
coordination. Also, the NC.A.A-staged championship competitions became more
important to schools with big-time athletics programs. Later, the rise o f sports on
telev ision enabled the NCAA to become a strong bargaining force for individual schools.
Finally , the N CA A gained recognition and legitimacy as the official spokesperson for
college athletics. In spite of its expanding role, however, the N C A A ’s ability to enforce
its rules was still very often unsuccessful as a result o f the unwillingness or inability of
presidents and faculty to control alumni and fans who were in search o f winning teams
(Slaughter. 1989).

The Camegie Foundation
In 1929, the NC.A.A solicited the Camegie Foundation for assistance in an attempt
to provide an independent evaluation o f the status of intercollegiate athletics For
thirteen years, the foundation investigated schools and programs ( Andre & .lames. 1991:
Durso. 1975: Lawrence. 1987: Lucas & Smith. 1978. Mallette & Howard. 1992:
Slaughter. 1989). The results of this investigation, Howard Savage's Amencan College
■Athletics, show ed the extent to which schools were ignoring the rules o f the NC.A.A.
Documenting professionalism, commercialism, and exploitation as well as violations in
the recruitinu and subsidizinu o f athletes, the Camesiie Foundation considered the illeual
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practices so widespread that they showed blatant disregard tor NCAA rules ( Byers. 1995:
Denhnger & Shapiro. 1975: Guttman. 1982. 1988: Lucas & Smith. 1978 1 In addition,
the study took presidents to task for their failure to defend the integrity o f higher
education i kjeldsen, 1982: Knight Foundation, 1993).
Macaroon ( 1991 ) felt that the Camegie report o f 1929 did not shnnk from
directly questioning the intellectual quality and sincerity o f .Amencan higher education
Itself It has also been noted that the report showed several cases where intercollegiate
sport was not under faculty control but was unduly influenced by overzealous alumni and
coaches ( Falla. 1981. p. 129 ). Hardy and Berryman ( 1982 ) pointed out that the report
suggested that any foreign visitor to an Amencan campus during football season would
immediately ask what relation such an "astonishing athletic display had to the work o f
an intellectual agency like a university " (p. 16).
Slaughter ( 1989 ) considered the pnmary purpose o f the Camegie Report to be to
provide a challenge to college presidents to take control o f their athletic programs and to
ov ercome the cumulative effects o f years o f benign neglect and blind obeisance to the
desires of students, alumni, trustees, and the public. It concluded that. "Apparently, the
ethical gearing of intercollegiate football contests and their scholastic aspects are of
secondary importance to the winning of victories and financial success” ( p 8).
This period was marked by an acknow ledgment on the part of the NC.AA o f
problems in intercollegiate sports. Unfonunately, it also denoted a lack o f eflbrt on the
part of the NCAA to prov ide solutions to these problems (Slaughter, 1989: Thelin. 1994).
The association admitted the problem, but shied away from attempting solutions. Part of
the problem was that the enforcement program o f the NCAA consisted only o f
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self-discipline among institutions rather than of any actual enforcement activities by the
NCAA ( Slaughter. 1989 )

The Rules Enforcement Decision o f the NC.AA
In 1941. the NC.A.A finally realized that it was not accomplishing what it had set
out to do — control intercollegiate athletics Therefore, a new constitution was created,
calling for the expulsion o f members who refused to follow the association rules and
guidelines. In 1948. the association adopted a “sanity code" that limited the awarding of
scholarships based on athletic ability: within a year, it had targeted seven institutions for
awarding scholarships to athletes based on athletic ability: twenty more were estimated
to have broken the rule (Fleisher. 1992: Lawrence, 1987: Slaughter. 1989. Stem. 1979:
Thelin, 1994). Even though the motion to suspend the seven institutions failed in a vote
of the membership, the ability to levy other sanctions was established within the NCA.A
as a result ( Byers. 1995; Fleisher. 1992: Robert & Olson. 1989; Stem. 1979: Thelin.
1994 ). Eventually the code establishing need as a cnterion for scholarship was repealed
so that scholarships could be awarded based on athletic ability : nevertheless, the
enforcement policy of the NCAA had begun (Byers, 1995: Slaughter. 1989).
In 1952. the "enforcement decision" was reached (Falla. 1981: Tow. 1982)
This very important decision gave the NC.AA formal control over rule making and the
authority to impose sanctions upon violators of recruiting, eligibility , and other rules
(Chu. 1982: Denlinger & Shapiro. 1975: Lawrence, 1987: Sperber. 1990: Stem. 1979).
Since the NC.A A Enforcement Office started keeping records on October 16. 1952. it has
documented 442 violations o f the NC.A.A Rule Book. In 96 o f these cases, institutions

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

were cited specifically tor lack o f institutional control

Since 1980. 55 cases o f NCA.A

violation based on lack o f institutional control involving 47 Div ision I athletic
institutions have come to light ( NCA.A Enforcement Summarv. 1995 ).

The College Football Association Challenge to the NC.A.A
In 1981, Stev e Horn, president o f Long Beach State, as well as other presidents,
lobbied for the sharing o f rev enue between all Division 1 institutions ( Byers, 1995 1. It
was felt that distributing revenues more broadly would reduce incentives to cheat. As
things stood then, schools sometimes would earn millions o f dollars from the handful o f
athletes who made the team a winner. Incentives to recruit and keep those
money-makers
was so high that rule breaking and exploitation were almost inevitable ( Andre and James,
1991).
The issue o f rev enue shanng scared the major football institutions into creating
the College Football Association ( Byers, 1995 ). The organization was formed on
February 2 . I98U, as a special interest group within the NC.A.A. it was made up o f 61
institutions with large-scale football programs (Byers. 1995; Thelin. 1994) With Chuck
Nanas as its executive director, it became a lobbying group creating rumors of the
possibility o f seceding if rev enue sharing became a reality .
Until the practice was declared in v iolation o f antitrust laws, the NC.AA required
that all schools abide by its television rules; this precluded any school from selling the
telev ision rights to its own Saturday afternoon games ( Noll, 1991 1. In 1981. two major
powers of the CFA. Georgia and Oklahoma, filed suit against the NCAA claiming pnce
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fixing, output restraints, and monopolizing under the Sherman Antitrust Act ( Funk,
1991)

Oklahoma and Georgia sued the NC.AA in order to gain the nght of

self-determination m the televising o f their ovvtt football games (Thelin & Wiseman.
1989).
In September of 1982. Judge Juan Burciaga in New Mexico ruled that the NC.AA
was a cartel and a monopoly and that its telev ison control constituted an unlawful
constraint o f trade in v iolation o f Section I of the Sherman Antitrust Act and an unlawful
monopolization o f the pertinent market, violating Section 2 ( Thelin, 1989). The
Supreme Court upheld the decision on June 27, 1984 ( Byers. 1995. Fleisher. 1992:
Guttman, 1988: Hart-Nibbrig. 1989: Sperber, 1990: Thelin, 1989). The NC.AA could no
longer act as the sole distributer o f college football games to national telev ision
networks

In effect, this decision made each college or university a seller in a new ly

deregulated sports television market and instigated a helter-skelter scramble to gain
access to the largest pnme-time sports audiences (Hart-Nibbrig, 1989).

The Difficulty o f Institutional Control
Frey 1 1985 ) has suggested three reasons for the problems of institutional control
o f athletics. First, the nature o f American colleges and univ ersities has been that o f a
public serv ice entity. Universities have pushed athletic departments into external
partnerships w hen institutional budgets for athletics were not increased, w hile athletics
costs hav e doubled in as little as ten years. Athletic departments hav e had to seek
revenue from external groups, who. in tum. desire control i.Atwell. 1980).
Because there was no reliable source of support, such as the State, the financing
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of higher education was often precanous. University presidents have found themselves
directing their energies more to fund raising than to educational development They have
had to adopt an entrepreneurial spirit relating more to the business and gov ernment
communities than to the academic The nature o f the modem university requires that the
president w ork at the boundary o f the institution focusing on obtaining resources from
the extemal env ironment ( Frey, 1994).
Colleges and universities have also been put into competition with each other for
resources ( Frey, 1985 ). The most popular solution athletics departments have used to
close the gap between flat revenues o f ticket sales and rising expenses is the soliciting o f
donations. Because o f this, presidents and athletics departments hav e relied on
communities for financial support.
.According to Pfeffer and Salanak 1 1978 ». once an organization subunit is defined
as vulnerable or in critical need o f resources, demands and dependencies expand.
Organizations are not self-sufficient; they are subject to uncertainties and may be
vulnerable to exploitation or extemal control by the outsiders who control resources the
organization needs. The controlling coalitions may have goals that are inconsistent with
those o f the larger organization. I f the larger organization cannot develop an altemative
base of resources, then it w ill not be able to counter the pow er of the external
constituencies over the subunit ( Frey. 1994 1
Athletics also broadened the appeal o f the institution to the community (Chu.
1982) and assisted in fund-raising and student recruitment (Frey. 1985 1. The result of this
was that govemance responded more to extemal constituencies o f the local community
than to intemal preferences o f the institution or of a national gov eming body such as the
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NCAA ( Frey. 1985: Simon. 1985 ». As a consequence, it was difficult to control athletic
departments because these units have very powerful network constituents in the
community ( Frey. 1994 ) Flovvev er. these linkages were not just the result o f university
efforts: the community saw the value o f athletics and cultivated profitable linkages.
Riley and Baldndge ( 1977) also felt that it was difficult to control departments
because the community has very powertul network constituents. They went on to say
that it was natural that community business and political elites would be attracted to
athletics, sports prov ided a vicanous reinforcement o f their ideals More important,
however, was the view that a successful college athletics program could reflect positively
on the community or region. The area could obtain national recognition or v isibility
should the college team be successful. In addition, any time a sporting event was
conducted, the business community reaped benefits.
The athletics department's ability to forge strong links to extemal constituencies
has promoted stronger independence compared to other institution subunits i Frey. 1985:
Riley and Baldridge. 1977: Sperber, 1990). These strong links to extemal constituencies
have lumed into w hat Frey ( 1982. 1986) called a booster coalition made up of booster
clubs, non-profit foundations, and independent athletic departments. The coalition is
composed o f alumni and community representatives who exchange resources in the form
o f money, materials, and political influence for the right to associate with coaches and
athletes, for the status or prestige this association brings, and for the access to other
persons like themselves who may possess political and economic resources that coalition
members need or want ( Frey. 1994 ).
Frey ( 1985 ) pointed out that as any department on campus retains autonomy.
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athletics ha\e acquired independence, but the latter's autonomy exceeds what is possible
for the other subunits. This is Iargel> due to the abiiit> oCathletic departments to build
connections with significant external constituencies to an extent beyond what other
university subunits have been able to do. The established distribution o f power by means
o f this alliance is an accepted way of doing business: it has cultural support: and it has
some legitimation within the larger organizational context because univ ersm
administrations prefer to rely on this alliance rather than make the changes necessarv to
redirect their resource-acquisition strategies ( Frey. 1994)
Frev ( 1982 >has asserted that presidents, facultv, and students will always lose the
control battle because they do not have the resources to compete with those av ailable to
the booster coalition. Thelin ( 1989) has also pointed out that a partnership o f powerful
external boosters and the athletics department is a formidable opponent for a president
This partnership makes entrepreneurial athletics directors especially strong: at some
universities, the athletics directors may have a bener chance than the president to prevail
in a major confrontation (Davis, 1979: Miller. 1982).
Finally. Frey and other authors have pointed out that it is the nature o f the
universitv to be composed o f loosely related segments and to have many goals, numerous
and vaned constituencies, and fragmented decision-making (Aldnch, 1979: Frey. 1985.
1986. 1994: Riley & Baldridge, 1977). The American college or universitv. as Cohen
I 1974) has stated, is a prototv pe of organized anarchy Its goals are either vague or in
dispute: its technologv is familiar but not understood: its major participants wander in
and out o f the organization. These factors do not necessarily make it a bad organization
or a disorganized one, said Cohen, but thev do make it a problem to describe, understand.
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and lead. It can also create a situation where weakly-connected departments act
independently of each other and o f the institution ( Riley and Baldridge. 19 7 7 1.
Frey ( 1994 1. Lapchick ( 1987). and Thelin ( 1989) have maintained that a number
o f the problems m college athletics can be traced to the fact that many programs have
operated separately from their institutions, w ith little or no accountability to the president
or chancellor.

Riley and Baldridge ( 1977) have said that decision making is often shared

and participatory and appears disorderly at times, but it reflects the autonomy o f
departments and professionals. It is a system with little central coordination and is
almost an organized anarchy in which each individual in the university is seen making
autonomous decisions. The decision making reflects the variety o f goals, the multiplicity
o f specialized interests o f faculty and departments, and the autonomy o f athletics
Davies ( 1979) and Thelin ( 1989) have contended that although the confusion
disturbs the president, it also serv es him. An ambiguity o f power, as Cohen and March
( 1974) point out. leads to a parallel ambiguity o f responsibility. Nowhere is this
ambiguity more striking for presidential authority than in intercollegiate athletics. If no
one IS in charge, no one is to blame Presidents, as well as athletics directors, may hide
behind the NC.AA umbrella when things turn bad (Thelin, 1989).
Combining with the service orientation and the loosely coupled nature o f the
higher education institution is the independent nature of athletics and the long tradition
o f local autonomy

Stem ( 1979) contended that the local autonomy of the institution was

affected by three factors related to the NC.AA. First was the fact that the original 38
schools insisted that their own programs be controlled by their own f:hool faculty.
Second, the NCAA 1906 constitution established local autonomv and facultv control of
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programs as fundamental pnnciples. In addition, the NCAA 19u9 constitution permitted
schools to rile written objections to any legislation enacted by the delegates: such a tiling
made the legislation non-binding on the institution. Third, the nght o f self-governance
for constitution members was continually referred to in the rhetonc o f association
meetings, particularly when the issue o f enforcement o f N C A A rules o f eligibility and
conduct was debated. Thelin ( 1994). too. has pointed out that higher education has
traditionally been a markedly decentralized arrangement characterized by institutional
autonomy, voluntary association, and relatively little government regulation. This
principle o f local autonomy established a pattern o f loose coupling within the NCAA
(Flath, 1964: Stem. 1979),
In an effective organization, as Lawrence and Lorsch ( 1967) hav e stated, each
subunit develops characteristics that enable it to deal w ith a particular sector o f the
env ironment

However, at the same time, these subunits must be integrated for the

purpose o f control — the essence o f organizational control is the restnction o f subunit
autonomy (Frey. 1904)
Restricting the autonomy o f the athletics department has been difficult. "Doing
something" about athletics carries great personal nsk for a president ( Frey 1982: Thelin
1989 ). It’s nsky business as Hanford ( 1976 1 has said, and academic lore is full of
unpleasant stories about university presidents who have been forced out by athletic
imbroglios. Paul Hardin of SMU, for example, was fired in 1974 after he exposed
significant v iolations of NC.A.A rules on his own campus (.Andre & James. 1991:
Oberlander. 1988c: Thelin. 1989). In 1988, first-vear Indiana Universitv President
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Thomas Ehrlich committed a cardinal Hoosier sin when he openly criticized popular,
successful basketball coach Bobby knight (Thelin. 1989 1.
Unfonunately. for presidents, intercollegiate athletics often is a no-win
proposition. No matter what happens, someone is visibly and vocally upset: this can lead
to the syndrome o f presidential inattention’ ( Hanford 1976: Thelin. 1989). .According to
Thelin. a president may legitimately wonder if it is prudent to nsk one's office on
something as educationally peripheral as athletics: even the most courageous college
presidents may feel that accepting the local status quo is the best strategy
There are still other problems noted in the literature concerning the institutional
control o f athletics. Smith ( 1989) pointed out the fact that while chief executive officers
head individual institutions, the control o f athletics necessitates inter-institutional
agreements. .A truism in college sports is that one president or institution which makes a
dramatic move will do so alone (Thelin. 1989 ): not even a courageous president dares to
embrace the notion o f "unilateral disarmament." The harsh news, as Thelin has pointed
out. IS that abuses in intercollegiate athletics will be solved only when presidents and
institutions act together.
Another difficulty lies in the fact that college presidents are hired and fired by
governing boards: therefore, it is rare for a president to take a stance on athletics that
differs from that o f the board ( Smith. 1989). Indeed. Thelin ( 1989) believ es that. "The
more intense, the more v isible. and the more costly the athletic program, the less
influence the CEO has over it ( p 75 ).
It IS clear that, from the beginning o f intercollegiate sport, presidential
involvement and leadership have never been consistent. Vet. leading a university is a
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much more complex and demanding task today than it was thirty or fom years ago
(Slaughter. 1989) This opens the way for highly paid athletic directors, large athletic
department staffs, booster clubs, and even independent corporations with their own
boards of directors to run all or a portion o f the athletic program (Slaughter. 1989. p.
186).
Walter Schenkel ( 1971 ) considers "governance o f the contemporary university to
be a complex system o f checks and balances in which it is virtually impossible for a
single person to dominate the governance process" ( p

12). The NCAA has, however,

assigned responsibility for control o f athletics specifically to the university president.
Caught between the demands o f the NCAA and the pressures to creating winning
programs, chief executive officers can find their job o f controlling athletics very
complicated

Commercialism and Winning at All Cost
Presidents have learned of their communities’ lust for winning: most believe that
a winning program attracts students, financial contributions, and favorable legislative
appropnations ( Frey. 1986 ). According to Guttman ( 1982 ). the lust for winning extends
to alumni and state legislators; "It is common knowledge that alumni and state legislators
are invariably more generous to their alma mater or state university when the football
team has done well" ( p 7 3 1.
Most CEU's choose not to be in the direct finng line should athletic problems
erupt ( Miller. 1982 ). So who is in the direct firing line ’ Some might say it’s the athletics
director. Accordinu to M iller, however, it is the head coach who faces the greatest

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

42
pressures to win. As early as the late 1800's, coaches had to win to keep their jobs
(Camp. 1894: Lucas & Smith. 1978).

Bringing in the professional coach m the latter

1800's did not change the emphasis on winning: instead it intensified it. The emphasis
on winning continued on into the 1900 s. Hardy and Berryman ( 1982 1 quoted Amherst's
president. Alexander Meiklejohn. as saying in 1922 that \ ictones indicated better than
anything else the quality o f the undergraduate life " ( p. 24).
Enormous financial rewards for winning expanded dunng the l96U's and
multiplied in the I970's and I980's. NCAA enforcement never kept pace and the
effectiveness o f conference commissioners as regulators and enforcers became virtually
non-existent ( Byers. 1995 ). Indeed, according to Andre and James ( 19 9 1). winning is so
lucrative that schools face great pressure to circumvent or violate whatever standards
exist
By 1980. according to Lapchick ( 1996). the number one. and perhaps only, rule
that mattered was winning: n sold tickets and increased chances for T V coverage.
Coaches who followed this rule kept their jobs: no one pointed a finger at the coaches
unless they lost. Richard Dav ies ( 1995 ) has declared that. " If you lose your games,
you're certain to be fired. I f you break the rules, you have to be caught to be fired" ( p
27 ). As Rooney ( 1980 ) observed, a little cheating buys time in what can be described as.
at best, an insecure profession ( 1980). It can hardly be surpnsing that when confronted
by the stark contrast between success and failure, many, if not most, coaches are tempted
to do whatever needs to be done to win.
In addition, successful head coaches today are rewarded with salaries in the
hundreds of thousands o f dollars, with fast food franchises, stocks, bonds, homes.
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automobiles, country club memberships, income-producing telev ision and radio shows,
highly lucrative product endorsements, lecture and sports clinic opportunities, and other
special amenities i Edwards. 1986 > Over time, as the rewards for winning have
multiplied, so have cheating and the breaking of rules t Byers. 1995 1 As Funk ( 1991)
said, "Coaches are under intense pressure from administrators and alumni to produce
Victones. These pressures, combined with the tremendous monetary and material
rewards available to successful Division I coaches, motiv ate some in the business to use
any means necessary to secure the skilled athlete" (p. 89».
The I980’s was a period when many o f the unfortunate effects o f the pressures
surfaced. Irregularities and illegalities at universities as div erse as Mary land. Georgia.
Minnesota. SM U, Tulane. and USC were widely publicized (Wheeler. 1996, p. 132 1.
.According to Simon ( 19 9 1». a particularly sad account o f abuse o f the rules, which
unfortunately may not be aty pical, is prov ided by former Clemson University basketball
coach Tates Locke. As Locke described the situation at Clemson. said Simon. "There
was a tremendous pressure on him to win. WTiile he did not let himself know about
many o f the recruiting violations involving under-the-table payments to players which
were perpetrated by alumni and boosters, he may have condoned deceptions designed to
lure recRiits to Clemson" (Simon, p. 127».
One o f the few attempts to correct the attitude that coaches need to win was
offered by Leonard koppett according to Sperber ( 1990 ). koppet's feeling was that
coaches should have the same status as professors and be hired according to the same
standards o f integnty and at comparable salaries. This, he said, would free them o f he
win-at-all-costs demands.
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A recurrent cnticism o f college sports and a contributing cause o f the win-at-allcosts attitude is that college sports have become a big business characterized by
commercialism and professional (Frey. 1982: Koch. 1971: Rooney. 1985: Scott 1956:
Thelin. 1989 1. Lucas and Smith ( 1978) explained that the commercial aspects o f
intercollegiate athletics began early as a means o f surv iv al when students had to raise
money to support and finance college athletics. " If administrators in the beginning had
controlled athletics and financed them through proper channels, then students may not
have commercialized them for reason o f surv iv al " ( p. 225 1 Also, as Riley and
Baldridge ( 1977) and Raibom ( 1982 ) have pointed out. universities have pushed their
athletic departments into external partnerships by not increasing their athletic budgets
while athletic costs have increased significantly. Athletic departments have had to seek
revenue from external groups, who. in turn, desire control (Atwell. I98(J). The results
have made it difficult to control athletic departments because they have v ery developed
powerful network constituents.
In the early |900’s the commercial and professional aspects o f athletics began to
intensify

Players wanted to win because o f institutional and individual prestige: alumni

wanted to win for it was the most visible symbol o f a virile institution: college
presidents felt that success in football meant greater institutional as well as personal
recognition, for the coach — his job depended on it (Lucas & Smith. 1978).
The desire for popular support led college presidents to adv ertise their institutions
m any way they could No other advertising medium had a greater hold upon the
populace than did athletics (Lucas & Smith, 1978 ). The use o f athletics as an
advertising tool was started in the 187U's and was a national phenomenon by 1900
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University o f Chicago's president Harper attempted to promote his institution with
winning teams by hiring Amos Alonzo Stagg. According to Lucas and Smith, he told
Stagg to develop teams which "we can send around the country and knock out all the
colleges. We will give them a palace, a car. and a vacation, too” (p. 219). President
McCosh o f Princeton recruited students by mentioning \ ictones ov er Harv ard and Yale
C.AL sent its track team on a tour o f the east in 1895 to pursue their goals in part by
taking advantage o f the publicity successful athletic programs could generate ( Femer.
1930: Schmidt 1957). VATien Indiana first won the state football championship, they
reportedly felt that every thing that was connected with their university became suddenly
interesting to the people o f the state (Lucas & Smith. 1978: Woodbum. 1940). President
Slocum o f Colorado College felt his institution would never gain the recognition that u
deserv ed until it had a winning football team i Lewis. 19o4 )
Not all college presidents favored advertising their institutions through athletics
though they generally did not speak out loudly for fear o f losing enrollment, public
support, or alumni backing (Lucas & Smith, 1978). For example. President Charles Eliot
o f Harv ard spoke out against the promotion o f athletics. .Although he onginally rowed
for Harvard crew, he later became disillusioned with athletics. He denied that athletic
wins and losses affected prestige and enrollment.
-Although commercialized collegiate athletics was a growing industry before
midcentury, financial domination of big-time collegiate football and basketball is a post
World War II phenomenon.

The factors identified by Sage ( I99U) that contributed to

this were the growth of mass media and telev ision rev enues, the development o f rapid
and convenient air transportation making possible interregional rivalries, an increase in
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leisure time and discretionary income, and the advent of Sports Information Directors
and their w idely successful ad\ ertismg efforts ip

174 1.

Athletics has alway s been a business to a certain extent, but according to Funk
( 19 9 1) today's athletic endeavors have definitely become a big business, the profit
motive has increased the necessity and importance of winning, and the wmning-iseveryihing attitude has opened the door to the moral decay afflicting college athletics ( p.
93 ). The effect on colleges has been to sharpen the financial importance o f w inning to a
team and league. The obvious result is to increase the incentiv es to v iolate NCAA rules
in order to recruit the kinds of athletes who improve the athletic program (Noll. 1990).
Simon ( 19 9 1) also has agreed with the contention that sports has become big
business. Television revenues and the visibility and support which come with winning
basketball and football teams seem to many to undermine the educational ideal o f sports,
according to Simon and to Wheeler (1996). Byers {1995) maintained that telev ision is
commercializing all of Amenca's values. The need to compete with professional teams
for the entertainment dollar became, ex post facto, a legitimate economic argument o f
the football coaches (p. 136)
.According to Hart-Nibbng ( 19 9 1 ). universities and the NCAA have tailed by and
large to contain the commercial aspects o f sports. A part of the problem is that schools
have perpetuated an vicious cycle o f the need to win. In intercollegiate athletics, huge
coaching and recruiting staffs are necessary to compete with other schools Winning
teams are necessary to justify the staffs. The staffs are necessary to produce the wins.
The wins are necessary to sell the tickets and rate T V exposure. The income is necessary
to justify the expense of producing the wins. Some authors hav e felt that the sharing of
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television and bowl revenues within a conference would make winning less important
and so lesson the schools' incentive to cheat (Andre & James. I9 9 |: Byers. 1995 ». Either
way. one person who can make a difference in solving the problem is the college
president.

Presidential Efforts to Control Athletics
Mallette and Howard ( 1992) wrote that "the college presidency is a complex job
with multiple responsibilities, many competing values and prionties. and an abundance
o f distractions. But w hether the campus is large or small. Division 1 or 111, 'big time' or
small time.' the president still is accountable for ensuring the integrity o f the
intercollegiate athletics program" (p. 31).

Observers agree, according to Thelin ( 1994),

that the key figure in reform is the college or university president. However, making
decisive changes in athletics policy is not easy for a president who must contend with
external pressures, problems o f a single campus working in isolation, and the visibility of
college sports. Presidents who take a stand as national leaders and spokesman on
containing the costs and abuses o f college sports show a high burnout rate ( Thelin. 1989 ».
From the early days, they have encountered difficulties from a number o f different
sources

For example, presidents, hired and fired by boards o f trustees, have usually not

taken stands in opposition to those who pay their salaries. As boards of trustees were
supportive o f intercollegiate athletics in the latter 1800's, it was natural for presidents not
to create controversies by calling for drastic actions when intercollegiate athletics crises
occurred ( Smith. 1988).
However, univ ersity presidents, not governing boards, have usually been singled
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OUI for having the opportunity to reform athletics They have also been criticized for

seldom doing so Presidents, who throughout the nineteenth century had a great deal o f
power in controlling the destinies o f higher education, rarely took initiatives in reforming
athletics ( Smith. 1988). \ et some chief executive officers have spoken out against the
excesses o f intercollegiate athletics and some hav e taken strong action. President
.Andrew White o f Cornell said in 1883 that. "I will not permit 30 men to travel 400
miles merely to agitate a bag o f wind" ( Isaacs. 1978. p. 169 ). President Eliot o f Harv ard
condemned football with its increasing violence saying. "The game o f football grows
worse and worse as regards foul and violent play, and the number and grav ity o f injuries
which the players suffer. It has become perfectly clear that the game as now play ed is
unfit for college use" ( Report of the President o f Harvard College. 1893-1894. p. 16).
Benjamin Ide Wheeler o f Cal and David Starr Jordon o f Stanford led early efforts to
declare freshman ineligible for track and football during the 1910-1915 era (Schultz.
1989). President Woodrow Wilson o f Pnnceton commented that higher education was
forced to worry that the "sideshows" had started to swallow up the "circus." leav ing the
performers in the "main tent" to "whistle for their audiences, discouraged and
humiliated" i Hardy & Berryman. 1982 p. 21 ). Harold Stoke, former president o f New
Hampshire and LSU stated that the duties o f higher education have been transformed into
a responsibility o f the educational system to supply the public with entertainment
(Nov err. 1983)
President James B. Angel I of the University o f Michigan talked his fellow Big
Ten presidents into adopting rules to keep football within reasonable bounds. On March
9th. 19(16. thev limited the season to five names, restricted eliuibilitv to three vears with
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graduate students banned, students must hav e a year o f residence before competing in
athletics, they must have proper grades, training tables were abolished and capped
student ticket pnces at 50 cents. The coach had to be a full time faculty member. On top
o f this the Big Ten insisted on absolute facultv control. Unfortunately, president
AngelTs own football coach went to his board o f regents and the board pulled Michigan
out o f the big ten. Michigan did not rejoin until 1917 (Byers, 1995: Nelson. 1982.
Wilson & Brondfield, 1967).
In 1931, Dr James Angel I o f Yale stated. "I believe that any system which by its
very nature encourages proselytizing among boy athletes in the secondary schools is
pernicious. I do not believ e there is any obligation on the part o f the college to furnish
the general public nor even the alumni with substitutes for the circus, the prize fight, and
the gladiatonal combat" ( Nov err. 1983. p. 114). At about the same time. Dr Charles
Kennedy of Pnnceton declared. ”1 earnestly hope that the colleges of our country will
deflate intercollegiate football and restore it to its natural place in the life of the
undergraduates" ( Nov err. 1983. p

114).

.Also in the I930's. Abraham Flexner. a veteran o f the Carnegie Foundation
studies, cnticized the commercialism o f the Univ ersity o f Chicago football program
(Thelin. 19 9 4 1. Apparently. .President Robert Hutchins o f the University o f Chicago
agreed. He became one of the first presidents to eliminate a major collegiate sport by
dropping his school's football program (Nelson. 1982: Rooney. 1980). In dropping out of
the Big Ten Conference in 1946, Hutchins stated that, "Education is primarily
concerned with the training o f the mind, and athletics and social life, though they may
contribute to it. are not the heart o f it and cannot be permitted to interfere with it
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(Byers. 1995. p. 4 !)

Everett Case ot'Colgate speaking in 1947 asked, "Where is the

glory in a Colgate \ ictory won by men not picked and developed from the regular student
body but offered special financial inducements to 'represent' you? What would you think
o f your college if we used funds entrusted to us for educational purposes to go out and
hire a football team ’" ( Rooney . 1980. p. 21 )
In 1982, Father Lo Schiavo. the president of the Univ ersity o f San Francisco, after
renegade boosters were responsible for causing back-to-back probations, decided to
eliminate the basketball program. In dropping basketball. Father Lo Schiavo commented
that the university could no longer control its powerful booster organization: he said.
"There was no way to measure the damage done to the university’s most priceless assets,
its integrity and reputation" (Chronicle o f Higher Education. 1983, p. 26 ). Lo Schiavo
reportedly also declared that there are those who "are determined to break the rules
presumably because they are convinced that the university cannot stay within the rules
and maintain an effective competition program" ( Simon. 19 9 1. p. 4 3 1.
Father Lo Schiavo met with cnticism from his school's booster club. A member
o f the Don Century Club stated that "Lo Schiavo aspires to mediocnty and could never
form a selection committee that would bang us the type of coach we need. I hope for the
good of the university. Father Lo Schivo goes" ( Boston Globe. 1983. p. 29: Simon. 1991.
p. 65 ), However. Father Lo Schiavo prev ailed and amateur norms are being restored at
the University o f San Francisco. Basketball players are recruited locally, the mission in
this case is to demonstrate that a basketball program can stay clean and still win. Alumni
help raise funds, but are no longer involved in recruiting (Hart-Nibbng. 1991 ).
Eamon Kelly o f Tulane University suspended it's basketball program after a point
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shaving scandal was uncovered: the key player at Tulane admitted having received
S10.UOO from an assistant coach on signing to attend the univ ersity in 19 8 1 ( Lapchick.
1986)
On the other hand, there have also been presidents who have commented
favorably on intercollegiate athletics. President Ethelburt D. Garfield o f M iam i o f Ohio
all but required his faculty to join the football team and became the only president to
ever incur an injury while competing for his college team (Rudolph. 1962: Schultz.
1989). President William Rainey Harper of the University o f Chicago hired former Yale
All-American Amos Alonzo Stagg to coach his team

to develop teams which we can

send around the country and knock out all the colleges We will giv e them a palace car
and a vacation too" (Lucas & Smith. 1978, p. 219).
John R. Hubbard o f USC called college sports the glue that holds the university
together ( kirshenbaum. 1980: Nelson. 1982). John Hannah, president o f Michigan State
in 1941. promoted athletics by saying. "I believe that somehow athletics are tied up with
that fiercely burning spint o f competition which has been the trademark o f Amenca
since the day it was discovered" ( Byers. 1995. p. 42 ). Unfortunately , Hannah s big time
athletics also, in the view o f Walter Byers ( 1995), fueled a new era o f cheating, which
soon brought the colleges to a crisis comparable to the one that drove Teddy Roosevelt to
act.

Governing Boards
Governing boards, many o f which were made up o f alumni, became a natural
method o f controlling athletics. Even thouuh Smith ( 1989) considered uoveminu boards
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a real power behind big-time athletics, he suggested that they hav e also been a source of
athletic abuse. Governing boards in the late nineteenth century, like presidents, spoke for
America when they endorsed football and other sports on the college campus. Boards
more and more were drawn from the business elite to set policy in American colleges and
universities. They soon began to set athletic policy as well. Smith ( 1988) wrote that
gov erning boards, condoning the business aspects o f athletics, increasingly agreed to the
hiring o f professional coaches and the erection o f large stadiums which could seat far
more that the number o f student and staff. "The brutal nature o f mass plays in football
probably mirrored the businessmen's world, as did the commercial aspect o f football"
(Smith, p. 98).
One telling example o f abuse o f athletic governance power occurred in Texas
While the head of the board o f governors, the newly-elected governor o f Texas. Bill
Clements, was involved in paying a football player to attend Southern Methodist
University (Andre & James. 1991: Trager. 1990). Neither was SMU's nearby neighbor.
TC U . immune to the negative results o f the governing board behavior It was found that
a payment-to-players scheme was coordinated by a member o f the TCU Board o f
Trustees ( Lapchick. 1986: Rooney , 1980). This exemplifies how the mixed interest o f
controlling athletics while still promoting winning programs is worsened by the fact that
governing boards generally do not have contact with the NC.AA. main enforcement
organization of college sports (Smith. 1989).
Thelin pointed out that the University of Miami President. Edward T

Foote, was

caught in a bind with his governing board. When Miami came under fire for athletics
abuses, at least one influential member o f the univ ersitv's uoverninu board said that
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nothing would interfere with the Hurricanes's dnve to be nationally competitive in
football (Sullivan. 1987. Thelin. 19891.
Since it is the president of a college, not its governing board, who sends a
representative to the NCAA, it is the duty o f the president, not the governing board, to
control athletics. The president is caught between these responsibilities, the demands o f
faculty , and the demands o f the governing board. But presidents are hired and fired by
boards, and it has been a rare president who has taken a stance on athletics which differs
from the board's (Smith. 1989). One who did was the president o f Clemson. William Lee
Atchley, who resigned when he realized that he could not control his athletics department
( Lapchick, 19 8 6 i. There was a power struggle between him and Bill McLellan. the
athletics director and the trustees would not give Atchley a vote o f confidence ( Lapchick.
1986). Similarly , when President John A. DiBaggio o f Michigan State tried to prev ent
his football coach from becoming the athletics director, he was overruled by the trustees
(Byers. 1995).
The Knight Foundation report has suggested that it is time for governing boards to
support their presidents. A number o f writers have asserted that with the support of the
governing board, a conscientious president may make a difference in the institutional
control of athletics (Mallette.& Howard. 1992: Schultz. 1989; Thelin. 1989)

The Faculty Athletics Representative
At the 19 9 1 annual conference o f the American Association o f University
Professors. Creed Black, chair o f the Knight Foundation Commission on the Future of
College Sports said. "O f all the people testify ing before the Knight Commission, the
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most disappointing, the least impressive, were the facultv athletic representatives. They
seemed to have no idea what their role was. Their role is obviously to represent
academic interests, but they seemed to have been co-opted by the athletic departments"
<Thelin. 1994. p. 150 ).
At most institutions, faculty athletics representative are responsible for
relationships with the N C A A and with the conference o f which the institution is a
member. They are also responsible for intra-institutionai relationships among the
faculty , administration, and department o f athletics. Finally , they should have a concern
for the academic and athletic performance and well-being o f the institutions student
athletes (Mallette & Howard 1992).
In many instances, the faculty athletic representative is the key person within
conferences. The most distinctive characteristic o f the Pacific Coast Conference,
according to Thelin ( 1994), was that its power was vested in its faculty athletic
representatives. The faculty athletic representative was usually appointed by the
president, often upon recommendation from the campus faculty senate Despite alleged
autonomy , the representative was still subject to pressure from the athletics director, the
coaches, and the president. Thelin contends that, in sum. it was unreasonable to expect
the faculty athletic representative either to represent faculty or to be influential in the
NCAA forum.

Conference Efforts in Governance
On the conference level, the one major effort made to control athletics came in
1951 when the Ivy League Conference de-emphasized athletics by dropping scholarships
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based on athletic ability (Byers. 1995: Guttman. 1988. 1991 ». At present, they offer only
needs-based and academic scholarships. According to Simon 1 1985 ». many would argue
that the only reputable intercollegiate athletic programs are those which resemble the
Division III or Ivy League lev els, where scholarships are given only for need, athletes are
treated as students, and competition is regional rather than national in scope.
Unfortunately, there have been examples where conferences have not been
effective in controlling athletics. Byers ( 1995 ) points out the plight o f the conference
commissioner as having the rather unenviable position o f sitting as judge o f those who
employ him. Vic Schmidt, the commissioner o f the Pac Ten, after punishing UCL.A and
USC for transgressions, saw his problems multiply ( Byers. 1995 ». He eventually was
asked to resign in June, 1958.
As commissioner o f the Southwest Conference. Howard Grubbs faced pressure
because o f a 1956 investigation into violations by Bear Bry ant s Texas A & M football
program. The message was clear. Investigate a power conference team and you
jeopardize your job (Byers. 1995). Following the retirement o f Grubbs in 1973. SWC
enforcement became far less effective ( Byers, 1995 ).
In 1971. Wayne Duke became the Big Ten Commissioner. After he had
problems with Michigan, its president. Robben Fleming, pushed through a change in
Duke's contract, amending it from a multi-year to a year-to-year contract. After retinng
in 1988. Duke was asked for parting advice for the presidents. Byers reports that he
responded, ” 1 said that a year-to-year contract is a mistake when you made it. and I say it
again today. One thing the Big Ten needs to do is give my successor a contract and. after
that, give him your support" ( Byers, 1995, p. 191 )
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As the years passed, fewer and fewer conference commissioners were willing to
place their careers at risk. Most conference commissioners have decided to let the
NCAA do it (Byers, 1995). Present-day conference commissioners emphasize
compliance programs and rules seminars: they leave tough enforcement matters to the
NCAA (Byers, 1995).

The American Council on Education
Founded in 1918, the American Council on Education (ACE) represents over
1,600 colleges and universities. Its purpose is;
to advance education . . . through comprehensive, voluntary , and
cooperative action on the part o f Amencan educational associations,
organizations, and institutions . . . and to serve education in such
undertakings as may be required and approved from year to year, from
generation to generation for the common welfare ( Funk. 1991. p. 107).
Because o f the link o f athletics w ith higher education, the ACE felt it was within its
mission to investigate, study, and comment upon intercollegiate sports (Funk. 19911.
In 1952. repeated instances o f scandals related to intercollegiate sports occurred.
Because o f these scandals, ACE funded an investigation (Hardy & Berryman. 1982:
Thelin. 1994). In the results o f the study, the weak regulatory performance o f the NCAA
was cnticized and the de-emphasis o f sports in college was recommended. In order to
offset the negative publicity generated by the criticism, the NCAA created the
Enforcement Decision of 1952: this gave the organization control over rule making and
over enforcement o f sanctions against violators o f rules (Chu. 1982).
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Despite the NCAA's new sanction powers, the ACE continued to be critical o f
intercollegiate sports. As a result o f a comprehensive study, the ACE called for major
reforms in college athletics. Derek Bok, head of Harv ard Univ ersity and chair o f ACE,
appointed a committee o f 26 presidents from schools across the country to create a plan
to implement its recommendations. Their first action was to form a Presidents' Board to
attempt to take charge of the NCAA ( Sperber. 1990; Byers, 1995 ). A favorable legacy of
the ACE Special Committee's report was that it showed presidential and institutional
concern (Thelin, 1994). On the negative side. Scott (1982) viewed the report as a failed
attempt to curb abuses.
In 1974, George Hanford created a report for the American Council o f Education,
the purpose o f which was to get college presidents to confront the future o f
intercollegiate athletics (Hardy & Berryman. 1982; Thelin, 1994: Durso. 1975: Rooney.
1980). In the report. Hanford listed the violations that were taking place in
intercollegiate athletics: they were:
►

Alterations o f high school transcripts

►

Threats to bomb the home of a high school principal who refused to alter a
transcript

*•

Changes made in admissions test scores

"

Substitutes, including assistant coaches, taking admissions tests

►

Ofiering jobs to parents or other relatives o f a prospect

►

Promising one package o f financial aid and delivering another

-

Firing from a state job the father o f a prospect w ho enrolled at auniversity other
than the state team's
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Tipping or otherwise paying athletes who perform particularly well on a given
occasion

►

Providing a community college basketball star with a private apartment and car

►

Getting grades for athletes in courses they never attended

►

Enrolling university athletes in junior colleges out o f season and getting them
grades there for courses they never attended

►

Using federal work-study funds to pay athletes for questionable or nonexistent
jobs

►

Getting a portion of work-study funds paid to athletes kicked back into the
athletic department kitt (Denlinger & Shapiro, 1975, p 249)
Thelin ( 1994 ) reported that Hanford claimed that faculty were relatively

uninvolved in intercollegiate athletics governance. Hanford also felt that regional
accreditation associations had abdicated responsibility and should be more active in
supporting institutional control of athletics: he recommended that a self-study o f athletics
be required as a requisite to regional accreditation.
Hanford's report, according to Thelin, highlighted the lack o f debate among
presidents as well as the scholarly inattention to policy issues surrounding college sports.
Frey felt at the time that inattention from college presidents and faculties might become a
thing o f the past. In fact, the inattention o f presidents to athletics is a charactenstic o f
the past. The ACE Committee on Division I Athletics pressured the NCA A to include in
its governance structure a board of presidents with the power to veto or modity N C A A
rules ( Bok, 1983 ). In January. 1984. this proposal was defeated at the NCAA
convention: in its place, the NCAA created a Presidents' Commission with limited
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authority It was vested with the power to review N C A A policy and practice, to place
items on the convention agenda, to conduct studies, and to demand a roll-call vote on any
council or convention issue. In June. 1985. nearly 200 presidents attended the
convention and every one o f the Presidents’ Commission proposals passed. In previous
years, it had been rare to see as many as a dozen presidents at NCAA conventions (Frey,
1986). The widespread presidential inattention to athletics had come to an end.

Presidents' Commission
The Presidents' Board, now called the Presidents' Commission, was an attempt at
presidential, inter-institutional control o f athletics. A group o f concerned presidents
from within the American Council on Education met in the early 1980's to discuss ways
to work within the N C A A to promote increased presidential power in athletics
( President's Commission Handbook. 1996-97; Bok, 1985: Thelin & Wiseman, 1989:
Thelin, 1994: Sperber. 1990: Macmillan. 1992 ). Their rationale was that individual
presidents are too busy to etTect change within athletics alone. Therefore, they
recommended forming a presidential board selected by their peers to control the NCAA's
agenda ( Sperber. 1990).
At the NCAA convention in 1984, the Presidents' Commission was formed as a
compromise between the ACE presidents and the N CA A (President's Commission
Handbook. 1996-97: Thelin & Wiseman. 1989: Sperber, 1990). As a result, it has less
power than the presidents had sought, but more than the NCAA staff had desired (Thelin
& Wiseman. 1989: Thelin. 1994). The commission consists o f presidents from all
divisions, but it is weighted with more Division 1 members. This reflects the attitude that
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problems in athletics belong primarily to big-time programs (Thelin & Wiseman, 1989).
The Presidents' Commission is empowered to:
(a)

Review any activity o f the association,

( b)

Place any matter o f concern on the agenda for any meeting o f the council
for any NCAA convention.

(c)

Request studies o f intercollegiate athletics and urge certain courses o f
action,

(d)

Propose legislation directly to the convention,

(e )

Establish the final sequence o f legislative proposals in any convention
agenda within the provisions o f Section 2-(e) of the Special Rules o f
Order,

(f }

Call for a special meeting o f the association under provisions o f Article
5 .7 o f the constitution,

(g)

Designate before printing notice o f any convention specific proposals for
which a roll-call vote o f eligible voters will be mandatory , and

(h )

.Approve appointment o f an executive director of the association
(President's Commission Handbook. 1996-97: Thelin & Wiseman. 1989 ).

The commission has made its presence felt through it efforts in a number o f
areas. In 1984, it successfully pressed for legislation establishing minimum academic
qualifications for participation in intercollegiate sports. Other proposals made by the
commission and adopted at a special convention in 1984 were: the institutional selfstudy requirement, the differentiation between major and secondary violations o f NC.AA
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legislation and the so called death penalty for repeat offenders, and the annual financial
audit requirement ( President's Commission Handbook. 1996-97).
In 1987. a special convention was held at the request o f a delegation from ACE
regarding the issues o f playing-season limitations and cost-containment. While several
o f the commission's recommendations regarding spring football practice and reductions
in grants-in-aid in the various sports were not successful, the membership did approve
establishment o f an 18-month National Forum on the proper role o f intercollegiate
athletics in higher education, as well as a series o f research studies in that regard. It also
adopted the proposals calling for studies o f financial aid limitations, numbers of
individuals involved on noninstitutional athletics staffs, limits on recruiting penods, and
the effects o f varsity participation on the academic performance and collegiate
experience o f freshman student-athletes ( President's Commission Handbook. 1996-97).
National Forums were held in Nashville in January, 1988 (featuring economic
considerations in athletics): in Orlando in June. 1988 (emphasizing the NCAA
membership structure. NCAA legislative and governance procedures, and financial aid):
and m San Francisco in January , 1989, at the annual convention (highlighting the effects
o f intercollegiate athletics participation on the student-athlete) (President's Commission
Handbook- 1996-97).
As a result o f these sessions, the Presidents' Commission sponsored four
successful legislative proposals at the 1990 NCAA Convention dealing with the
disclosure o f graduation rates: the reduction of time demands on student-athletes; the
reinstating o f the partial qualifier in Division 1 and permitting such individuals to
received need-based, non-athletically related financial aid: and permitting incoming
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student-athletes to received non-athletically related financial aid to attend summer school
prior to their full-time enrollment ( President's Commission Handbook. 1996-97).
The Commission met with success again the following year when it developed a
group o f proposals that became known as the "reform agenda. " Eight o f the ten
proposals were adopted at the 19 9 1 convention (President's Commission Handbook.
1996-97).
In 1992. the emphasis o f the Presidents' Commission shifted to matters of
presidential authority and institutional control. The Commission sponsored nine
proposals at the 1993 Convention — highlighted by the establishment o f an athletics
certification program in Div ision I — and all were adopted except for a portion of one
amendment. In addition, the Presidential Agenda Day was implemented at that
Convention, grouping in one specified day all legislation identified as being o f particular
interest to CEO's (President's Commission Handbook. 1996-97).
In 1996. the primary focus o f legislation supported by the Presidents' Commission
was the restructuring the association. A central goal was to affirm presidential control of
and responsibility for the NCAA. In 1997. the Commission was replaced by a new
Executive Committee composed exclusively o f CEO'S and division-specific presidential
bodies in each o f the three divisions (President's Commission Handbook. 1996-97).
Presidents have difficulty making headway on their own campuses unless they
can act within a common framework o f collective rules that will maintain adequate
minimum academic standards (Bok, 1983). It appears by the results o f the Presidents'
Commission at the N C A A conferences that presidents are well on the way to making the
maintenance o f adequate minimum academic standards a reality.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

63
The Knight Commission
In 1989, after a decade o f highly visible athletic scandals, the Knight Commission
was formed with a S2 million grant from the Knight Foundation to propose a reform
agenda for college sports ( Mallette & Howard, 1992). The report which resulted from
this study on intercollegiate athletics was called "Keeping Faith with the
Student-Athlete” (Thelin, 1994). The trustees o f the John S. and James L. Knight
Foundation were concerned that ".

. athletic abuses threatened the very integrity o f

higher education " (Knight Foundation, 1993, p. 10).
The Knight Commission Report described athletic abuses in the 1980’s that led to
the NCAA's censuring, sanctioning, or placing on probation 109 colleges and universities
(Fleisher, 1992 ). This group included more than half the universities playing at the
NCAA's top competitive level—57 ( 54"o) of 106 institutions. Evidence from nearly
one-third o f present and former professional football players who responded to a surv ey
near the end of the decade indicated that they had accepted illicit payments while m
college. In addition, more than half said they saw nothing wrong with the practice.
Another survey showed that among 100 big-time schools. 35 had graduation rates o f less
than 20“o for their basketball players: 14 had the same low rate for their football play ers.
In spite o f these indicators o f embarrassing scandals, the Knight Commission did
not approach college sports with a hostile attitude. Chairman James Knight said:
We have a lot o f sports fans on our board, and we recognize that
intercollegiate athletics have a legitimate and proper role to play in
college and university life. Our interest is not to abolish that role but to
preserve it by putting it back in perspective. We hope this Commission
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can strengthen the hands o f those who want to curb the abuses which are
shaking public confidence in the integrity o f not just big-time collegiate
athletics but the whole institution o f higher education. ( Knight
Foundation. 1993. p. 10)
The Knight Commission was attempting to do the same as President Roosevelt
had in 1905—to reform instead o f abolish intercollegiate sports. Yet as Creed Black, the
president o f the Knight Foundation, stated. "Public faith in higher education cannot be
sustained if college sports are permitted to become a circus, with the institution itself
little more than a supporting sideshow" (Thelin, 1994, p. 147)
The central concept proffered by the Knight Commission is that intercollegiate
athletics should reflect the values o f the university: therefore, the regulatory process
should be grounded in the primacy o f academic values (Thelin. 1994). Those taking part
in athletics should be student-athletes. To accomplish reform in this area, the
commission created a "one-plus-three" model. The "one” is presidential control
directed toward the "three" principles of academic integrity, financial integrity, and
accountability through certification ( Fleisher. 1992: Thelin. 1994: Macmillan. 1992).
The Knight Commission made a number o f recommendations for advancing
presidential control. The first recommendation was that governing boards ". . explicitly
endorse and reaffirm presidential authority in all matters o f athletics governance”
(Knight Foundation, 1993, p . l 2 ) . All financial matters in the athletics program were to
be delegated specifically to the president. It urged that the governing board assist the
president in establishing common principles for hiring, evaluating, and terminating all
athletic administrators, and it also affirmed the president's central authority in this role.
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A governing board’s expectations o f the president regarding athletics should be clear and
the board should take responsibility for reviewing the program annually. Finally, the
governing board should help the president to define the faculty 's role in terms of
academic issues in athletics (Knight Foundation, 1993).
The second recommendation of the Knight Commission was that presidents
should act on their obligation to control NCAA conferences (Knight Foundation, 1993, p.
13). The Commission felt strongly that presidents should formally retain the authority to
define agendas: offer motions: cast votes or provide voting instructions: and to review
and. i f necessary, reshape conference decisions. In so doing, the president influences
shaping the academic goals o f the conference ( 1993 ).
The third recommendation for enhancing presidential control was that presidents
should maintain control the N C A A (Knight Foundation, 1993, p. 12) This includes
making informed use o f their votes on the NCAA convention floor, following up on the
success o f the Presidents' Commission with additional reform measures, and continuing
to fight for athletic reform.
Presidential control must be directed to academic integrity: academic integrity
includes the fundamental premise that athletes must be students. It is comprised of the
areas o f admission, academic progress, and graduation rates. To promote academic
integrity , the Knight Commission recommended that the NCAA strengthen initial
eligibility requirements, link athletic eligibility to progress towards a degree, and use
graduation rates as a criterion for NCAA certification ( Knight Foundation, 1993, p. 18).
The commission further recommended that presidential control should also be
directed toward financial integrity. Financial integrity consists o f reducing the costs o f
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athletics and recommending that grants-in-aid cover the full costs o f attendance for the
very needy. It includes the curbing o f independence o f athletics foundations and booster
clubs, the reviewing and approving by each university o f all athletics-related coaches'
income, otiering long-term contracts to coaches, and financially supporting
intercollegiate athletics by each institution (Knight Foundation, 1993).
Finally, presidential control should be directed to the independent authentication
by an outside body o f the integrity o f each institution's athletics program. The
commission recommended that the NCAA extend the certification process to all
institutions granting athletics aid. They further recommended that each university should
undertake comprehensive, annual policy audits o f their athletics program. In addition,
this certification program should include the major themes put forth in the Knight
Commission's report (Knight Foundation. 1993).
A pnmary contribution o f the Knight Commission's report has been to bnng
together college presidents to face serious issues involving intercollegiate athletics
(Theliru 1994). Thelin pointed out that the 1929 Carnegie Report, the ACE Reports o f
1952 and 1974. and the Knight Commission Report all emphasized that college
presidents must be centrally involved. All warned against commercialization and
portray ed excesses o f recruitment, athletic scholarships, and special pnvi leges as
corruptions o f student athlete ideals. However, all reports suggested that intercollegiate
athletics be balanced not abolished.

Summary
Intercollegiate sports competition made its first appearance in 1852 with a
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student-organized crew race between Yale and Harvard; a second race followed in 1855.
Conflicts and disagreements arose almost immediately and the issue of governance of
intercollegiate sports was bom.

In this chapter, the literature related to the history o f

intercollegiate sports since that first race was reviewed. The literature traced the
governance o f athletics from students, faculty, alumni. N CA A to eventual institutional
control by the CEO. The research o f the literature has shown repeated unsuccessful
attempts in controlling intercollegiate athletics.
The complex governance structure o f the institution and the traditional
independence o f institutional units including that o f athletics has been shown to
contribute to the difficulty o f controlling intercollegiate athletics. Another factor that has
been discussed as a contributing element is the ability o f athletics to forge strong ties to
external forces such as boosters. Despite these problems and difficulties, the NCAA as
well as other organizations and many authors have called for strong presidential
leadership in the institutional control o f athletics. It is this issue o f institutional control
o f athletics that led to this studv.
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CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH DESIGN AND M ETHODOLOGY

In this chapter, the research methods used to determine the existence o f
institutional control o f collegiate athletic programs are described. Based on this
research, recommendations in areas o f improvement in institutional control over NCAA
Division I athletics for the future can be made.

Selection o f Population and Subjects
The total population o f 275 NCAA Division I colleges and universities listed in
the 19%'97 National Directory o f College Athletics were selected for use in determining
and comparing the existence o f control because a large proportion o f Division 1 schools
have been cited for lack o f institutional control. The chief executive officer, usually the
president or chancellor, and the athletics director o f each institution were surv eyed
regarding the issue o f institutional control o f athletics.

Survey Questionnaires
Two separate questionnaires were designed, one for the chief executive officers
and one for the athletics directors. The questionnaires consisted o f both specific and
open-ended questions the subjects o f which included the principles o f institutional

68
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control suggested by the Knight Commission and the NCAA Committee on Infractions as
well as other literature on the subject.
The queries were designed to allow subjects to express their feelings about the
extent and ongins o f control o f athletics at their institutions. The surv ey was in booklet
form, laid out so that it was easily read: the number o f questions was limited so that the
survey could be completed in thirty minutes or less. The questions were divided into
groups, mixing easily-answered questions with the more time-consuming questions so
that the survey would not be monotonous or boring to complete.
The survey was sent by first-class mail with a cover letter from the researcher
indicating the purpose o f the study. A second mailing took place approximately thirty
days after the first in order to increase the rate o f return. A total o f 149 survey s were
returned from athletics directors and 1Ü7 from chief executive officers.

The final return

rates were 54“b and 39® o respectively resulting in a combined return rate of 47® o (256
surveys ).

Reliability o f the Survey Instrument
A large population size was used to correct for random error. This consisted of
the chief executive officers and athletics directors from the entire list o f NCA A Div ision
1 institution. In addition, the reliability o f the questionnaires was tested by employing a
panel o f experts from the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, the site o f the research. The
panel consisted o f Dr. Carol Harter, President o fU N L V : Dr. Anthony Saville. professor
in the College o f Education: Dr. Brad Rothermel, former athletics director o f UNLV:
Charlie Cavagnaro, current U N L V Athletics Director: Dave Chambers, U N L V
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Compliance Officer: and Dr James Frey, UNLV sociologist. Test-retest with
altemate-forms was employed with the panel

Face Validity o f the Survey Instrument
Face validity was established in a preliminary test before assessing content
validity . A number of athletics personnel at the University o f Nevada, Las Vegas, such
as the assistant athletic directors and the compliance officers, were given the survey
instrument to confirm that the questions were reasonable and appropriate. These
personnel were considered to be semi-expert on the subject matter.

Content Validity o f the Survey Instrument
The panel o f experts from U N L V focused on testing for content validity o f the
questionnaire. The panel members were asked to review each question to confirm that its
answ er would be relevant in assessing the status o f the institutional control of athletics.

The Pilot Study
A pilot study was conducted to identity errors and weaknesses in the survey's
form and presentation such as typographical mistakes, overlapping response sets,
ambiguous instructions, and overly long or tedious format. A panel o f experts consisting
o f chief executive officers and athletics directors o f Division 1 institutions was used in
the pilot study. The panel consisted o f Dr. Carol Harter, President o f UNLV: Dr. Pat
Goodall, former President o f U N L V : Dr. Don Baepler, former President of U NLV: Dr.
Robert Maxson, President o f Long Beach State: Charlie Cavagnaro, current U N L V
Athletics Director: Dr. Brad Rothermel, former Athletics Director o f UNLV : Steve
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Holton. Athletics Director, Northern Anzona University : John Kasser. Athletics Director,
University o f California: and Bill Shumard. Athletics Director, Long Beach State.
The panel employed the following checklist to analyze the survey instrument;
*

Are there any typographical errors?

*

Are there any misspelled words?

*

Do the items measure the existence o f institutionalcontrol?

*

Are there any other relevant measures for institutional control that should
be added?

*

Do the item numbers make sense?

*

Is the type size big enough to be easily read?

*

Is the vocabulary appropriate for the respondents?

*

Is the survey too long?

*

Is the style o f the items too monotonous?

*

Are there easy questions in with the difficult questions’^

*

Does the survey format flow well?

*

Are the items appropriate for the respondents?

Data Collection
The surveys were mailed on September 30th. 1997 A self-addressed, stamped
envelope was included for returning the questionnaire to the researcher The respondent
was asked to return the questionnaire within four weeks. The return rate from this
mailing was 32“o. On November 16, 1997, those who had not responded were sent a
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follow-up letter and another copy o f the questionnaire. This resulted in the return o f an
additional 15“ o for a total response rate o f 47® o.

Data Analysis
Nominal and ordinal data were collected through percentage, yes-and-no, ratings
o f agreement, and scales. The open-ended questions were coded for patterns and themes
according to accepted methodologies.
The yes-and-no questions were used to determine if a specific strategy or element
o f institutional control existed at the institutions. A mean score, median, and mode for
each element o f institutional control was calculated from the completed surveys.
The ratings-of-agreement scale employed was a Likert-type using the categories
o f "Stronulv Agree." "Agree." "Undecided." "Disagree" and "Stronalv Disagree." The
scale was used to determine the extent to which the elements o f institutional control
existed or were utilized.
The percentage scale was blocked from

Ü

to

100® o

in

10® o

interv als. These scales

were used to determine the degree o f selected issues o f institutional control. For
example, regarding the issue of the amount o f money awarded from the state to fund the
athletics program,

0® o

would indicate that all revenue would have to be generated from

donations from private sources while 100® o would indicate that there was no need to
generate revenue from private sources. The conclusion would be that more control over
athletics would exist by an institution that did not need to generate private donations. A
mean score, median score, and mode for each percentage scale was calculated from the
completed surveys. The open-ended questions were utilized primarily in order to identify
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strategies for. or elements of, mstimtional control o f athletics that might not have shown
up in the research o f the literature. A list o f strategies and elements was then assembled
based on identified data. This list was used to create guidelines for institutions and the
NCAA w ho may w ish to test for or to implement increased institutional control o f
athletics.
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CHAPTER 4

DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS

Introduction
In this chapter, the information collected from responses to the research
questionnaires is presented and discussed. The questionnaires were completed and
returned by the chief executive officers and the athletics directors at the 275 NCAA
Division I colleges and universities listed in the 1996/97 National Directory of College
Athletics.
The purpose o f this investigation was to determine the current status of
institutional control o f athletics programs at the Division 1 schools by identifying the
sources and levels o f control and the methods by which control was exercised and to
determine where problems with control exist. The questionnaire used to obtain this
information was designed with the following questions in mind:
1.

To what degree and with what strategies was control exercised by the
chief executive officer o f the institution ’

2.

In what ways and to what extent was institutional control facilitated or
inhibited bv the governing board of the institution ’

74
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3.

In what ways did financial and operational policies o f the institution
influence and affect control o f athletics’

4.

In what ways were athletics directors involved in the institution's control
o f athletics?

5

In what ways were the school's boosters and alumni affecting the
institution’s control of athletics?

The Governing Board
Control o f athletics at a college or university begins with its governing board.
However, as Slaughter ( 1989) points ouL it is important that the governing board resist
the temptation to micromanage the daily life on campus. When a board involves itself in
micro-managing, says Slaughter, it undermines the authority o f its chief executive
officer. Rather than attempting to directly manage athletics themselves, boards need to
delegate the full authority for control o f the athletics programs to their CEO's and to
support them in exercising that authority. This need arises from the fact that it is the
chief executive officer, not the governing board, who has traditionally been identified as
the one bearing the responsibility for control o f the athletics program (Smith. 1988:
Thelin. 1989).
The governing board's delegation of authority to its president should be clearly
articulated in its mission statement. In addition, a governing board should assist its CEO
by drafting a mission statement in which it defines the role o f athletics at the institution:
this provides guidelines and standards within which the CEO can assert control. As
Table 1 show s, questionnaire responses indicated that a majority o f governing boards
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have written mission statements in which they define the role o f athletics. However, a
number o f respondents 16 ®o o f athletics directors and 2 !®o o f presidents) indicated that
their institution has no such mission statement.
Table 1; Mission Statement Concerning Role o f Athletics
Question; "Does the governing board have a mission statement concerning the role o f
athletics at vour university ?“
Response
Athletics Director
Frequency
Percent
Chief Executive Officer Frequency
Percent

Yes
131
94%
84
79%

No
8
6%
22
21%

Totals
139
100%!
106
100%

A larger majority o f boards, according to respondents, have addressed the issue o f
delegation o f authority to the CEO. Fewer than 2® o o f AD's and 5®b o f CEO's either
disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement, "The governing board o f your
institution has a clearly articulated mission statement concerning the authority of the
chief executive officer. ”
Another issue involving the governing board concerns the degree to which the
board is supportive o f presidential authority at their institution. As Table 2 shows: the
majority o f both chief executive officers and athletics directors ( 78® o in both cases)
strongly agreed that their governing board is supportive o f presidential authority at their
institution. O f the remainders, almost all agreed that their CEO receives the support o f
the board. Less than l°o o f respondents indicated either neutrality or disagreement with
this statement.
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Table 2; Governing Board Support o f Presidential Authority
Statement;

"The governing board is supportive o f chief executive officer authority at
vour institution."

Strongly
Strongly
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Totals
Response
141
0
Athletics Director
Frequency
110
30
1
0
0%
0%
100%
78% 21%
Percent
1%
105
Chief Executive Officer
Frequency
0
0
82
22
1
100%
0%
78% _21% ___ 1% ____ 0%
___ _______ Percent

On the other hand, although they felt that the boards are supportive of the
president's authority in managing the athletics program, a majority — 65®o o f the
presidents and 70% o f the athletics directors — also either strongly agreed or agreed that
their governing boards expect winning programs.
Table 3; Governing Board Expectations Regarding Wins
Statement; "The governing board o f your institution expects the athletics department to
have winning programs."

Athletics Director
Chief Executive Officer

Response
Frequency
Percent
Frequency
Percent

Strongly
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
Totals
Agree
Agree
Neutral
141
1
84
16
15
25
11%
1% 100%
11%
60%
18%
16
6
105
56
12
15
15%
6% 100%
11%
53%
14%

The board’s expectations o f a winning program does not in itself constitute a
problem. However, it could translate into pressure from the governing board on the chief
executive and the athletics director and, in turn, on the coaches. This could constitute a
problem because pressure to win can translate into a win-at-al 1-costs attitude ( Rooney.
1980). It can become so intense that coaches and athletes, as well as the university
administration, sometimes put athletic success ahead o f educational achievement
(Simon, 1985). When governing boards expect coaches to win. a situation can be created
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whereby the coaches believe that it is more likely that they will be fired for not winning
than that they will be fired for violating NCAA rules (. Davies. 1995: Frey. 1994).
The extent o f the financial support which the governing board provides for the
operation o f the athletics department can result in yet another pressure on the coaches I f
the financial support provided by the board is not enough for the athletics department to
be self-sufficient, the institution will of necessity search externally for revenue to fund
the program ( Riley & Baldridge. 1977). This external revenue will come either from
boosters seeking control or from the gate receipts from winning programs {Atwell,
Grimes, & Lopiano, 1980: Riley & Baldridge, 1977).
The questionnaire results shown in Table 4 make it evident that many chief
executive officers believe that the governing board o f their institutions does not provide
enough financial support for the athletics department to be self-sufficient.
Table 4: Extent o f Financial Support
Statement: "The governing board provides enough financial support to your institution
for the athletics department to be self-sufficient."
Strongly
_________ Response
Agree
Frequency
8
Percent
8%

Agree
34
35%

Neutral
13
13%

Strongly
Disagree Disagree
30
13
31%
13%

Totals
98
100%

This question was asked o f the CEO's alone. Those chief executive officers who
responded either "Strongly Agree " or "Agree " total 43® o. The total for those w ho
disagreed or strongly disagreed was 44%. According to this, almost half o f the
institutions underfund their athletics departments. It is probable that these institutions
are searching externally for revenue to fund their athletics programs.
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The Athletics Director
The athletics directors are critical elements in the institutional control of
athletics. Many problems in college athletics can be traced to the fact that athletics
directors, coaches, and athletics departments have operated separately from institutions,
with little or no accountability to the president or chancellor ( Lapchick 1987: Thelin,
1989). Chief executive officers have learned o f their communities' lust for w inning, and
most choose not to be in the direct firing line should athletic problems erupt: they are
thereby abetting this independence o f AD's ( Miller, 1982 ). Some athletics directors,
hung out on a limb, have been chewed up like confetti, as have head coaches and
assistant coaches in such high pressure sports as football and basketball (Miller. 1982).
However, chief executive officers can no longer ignore the problems o f athletics. They
have been mandated to take control and bring athletics back into the fold of the
institution (Knight Commission 1991: M iller. 1982: Scott, 1982: Slaughter. 1989).
A key aspect o f institutional control involves the role o f the athletics director at
the institution. Potential problems exist when the duties o f the athletics director include
coaching responsibilities. As Thelin {1989 ) pointed out. "The dual role of head coach
and athletics director is a dangerous concentration o f roles and powers, is increasingly
rare, and often signals an institution more concerned with emphasizing one or two sports
at the expense o f a balanced, equitable intercollegiate sports program” (p. 92). The
surv ey results showed that 97% o f institutions have separated the athletics directors from
coaching responsibilities.
The athletics director o f an institution is critical to the institutional control o f
athletics. I f the athletics director is not supportive o f presidential authority, then control
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o f athletics is more difficult to attain. The responses to the survey were almost
unanimous in either agreeing or strongly agreeing that athletics directors are supportive
o f presidential authority .
Table 5: Support for Presidential Authority by Athletics Director
Statement: "The athletics director at your institution is supportive o f presidential
authority.”

Athletics Director
Chief Executive Officer

Response
Frequency
Percent
Frequency
Percent

Strongly
Agree
128
90%
89
84%

Agree
15
10%
16
15%

Neutral
0
0%
1
1%

Totals
143
100%
106
100%

Similarly , all CEO's indicated that the athletics director at their institution is committed
to NCAA rules education compliance.
A major issue for the institutional control of athletics is the relationship between
the athletics department and the success o f its programs. The chief executive officers
are, in many cases, faced with the same pressures as the athletics directors and the
coaches. They can be fired for the same reason as the football coach is fired (Scott.
1982, p. 35 ). Every one agrees that losing games can get you fired ( Denlinger & Shapiro.
1975: Fleisher, 1992: Frey, 1988, 1994: Funk. 1991 : Guttman. 1982. 1988: Isaacs. 1978:
Hart-Nibbng & Cottingham. 1989: Simon, 1985: Smith, 198: Rooney. 1980). On the
other hand, if coaches feel they must win at all costs, or break N C A A rules in order to
win. then athletics scandals can occur. Blackburn and Nykos ( 1974 ) commented. " I f the
team falters, if scandal clouds the campus, i f the university is embarrassed, the president
almost always takes substantial blame" (p. 6 5 ).
One situation that can lead to this is when athletics directors expect coaches to
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have winning programs as the highest priority. The data in Table 6 shows that many
athletics directors do expect coaches to have w inning programs: 39*^o o f them said that
they agreed or strongly agreed that this is true.
Table 6; Athletics Director's Expectations o f Coaches
Statement: "The athletics director at your institution expects coaches to have winning
programs."
Strongly
Response
Frequency
Percent

Agree
7
5%

Agree
49
34%

Strongly
Neutral
Disagree Disagree
11
61
15
10%
8%
43%

Totals
143
I00“o

When the same question was asked o f CEO's, their responses showed that many
more o f them feel that AD's expect their coaches to have winning teams. Ninety-three
percent o f respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement.
Table 7: Athletics Director’s Expectations o f Coaches (According to CEO's)
Statement: "The athletics director at your institution expects coaches to have winning
programs.”
Strongly
Response Agree
Frequency
24
Percent
23%

Agree
74
70%

Strongly
Neutral
Disagree Disagree
1
4
3
4%
1%
3%

Totals
106
100%

This expectation by athletics directors that their coaches have winning programs does not
necessarily mean that the coaches will cheat. However, it does reflect a pressure that
would add to the temptation for a coach to cheat in order to win.
A related issue concerns whether or not the athletics director at an institution
believes the stability o f his or her position depends on having winning programs. The
data in Table 8 shows that a substantial number o f respondents (40® o o f AD's and 469 b of
CEO's) felt that athletics directors believed the stability of their position depends on
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having winning programs. Again, this does not necessarily mean that pressure would be
put on coaches to win, but it is certainly an element that could contribute to the
temptation to cheat.
Table 8: Stability o f Athletics Director Position
Statement: "The athletics director at your institution believes the stability o f his or her
position depends on having winning athletics programs."
Strongly

Strongly
Athletics Director
Chief Executive Officer

Response
Frequency
Percent
Frequency
Percent

Agree
Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Totals
64
6
56
15
143
2
45%
39%
10%
4%
100%
1%
41
36
6
7
16
106
34%
7%
39%
15%
6%
100%

A parallel issue concerns coaches and whether or not they believe the stability o f
their positions depends on having a winning program. Coaches can be under intense
pressure to produce victones: i f they believe the stability o f their position depends on
having winning programs, there is a chance they will cheat to win.

In addition, these

pressures, combined with the tremendous monetary and material rewards available to
successful Division 1 coaches, motivate some in the business to use any means necessary
to secure the skilled athlete (Funk, 1991 ).
Table 9: Stability o f Football and Basketball Coaches Positions
Statement: "Football and basketball coaches at your institution believe the stability o f
their positions depends on having a winning program."

I Strongly [
Athletics Director
Chief Executive Officer

Frequency
Percent
Frequency
Percent

20
14%
17
16%

f
90
63%
71
67%

Strongly
9
6%
5
5%

21
15%
12
11%
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2%
1
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143
100%
106
100%
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The data in Table 9 shows that 83® o o f chief executiv e officers and 77® o o f
athletics directors strongly agreed or agreed that football and basketball coaches at their
institutions believe the stability o f their positions depends on having a winning program.
The same question was asked of both chief executive officers and athletics directors in
regard to coaches o f Olympics sports (track, tennis, golf. etc. ); the results were similar
— 5 l®o o f CEO's and 50®b o f AD's either agreed or strongly agreed that these coaches
believe their positions are reliant on winning: this is shown in Table 10.
Table 10: Stability o f Position o f Olympic Sport Coaches
Statement: "Olympic sports coaches (tennis, soccer, golf, etc. ) at your institution believe
the stability o f their positions depend on having a winning program."

Response
Frequency
Athletics Director
Percent
Frequency
Chief Executive Officer
Percent

Strongly
Strongly
Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Totals
Agree
17
4
4
68
50
143
47%
3%
3%
12%
35%
100%
20
27
104
48
4
5
4%
5%
46%
19%
26%
100%

Another potential problem for the institutional control o f athletics exists when the
contracts o f coaches contain athletics performance clauses that could cause the contracts
to be non-renewed. Coaches are extremely competitive anyway , as Sperber ( 1990 )
pointed out: they can be so obsessed with winning that they will bend or break the rules
to obtain the winning edge. Performance clauses that could cause non-renewal increase
the chances that coaches w ill feel the pressure to break NCAA rules. Dennis Wagner
( 1997) o f the Arizona Republic said that "College coaches get caught between the NCAA
rule book and the knowledge that their careers depend on winning" (p. 203 ). Frey ( 1994)
said it more plainly: " If you lose your games, you are certain to be fired. I f you break the
rules, vou have to be caught to be fired" (p. 6). The data collected in the survey showed
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that many coaches in Division I athletics did indeed have performance clauses that could
cause their contracts to be non-renewed. The question was asked of the athletics
directors: the results are shown in Table 11.
Table 11: Performance Clauses for Football and Basketball Coaches
Question:

Do the contracts o f football and basketball coaches contain athletics
performance clauses that could cause the contracts to be non-renewed?"
Response
Frequency
Percent

Yes
35

No
107
25%

75%

Totals
142
100%

According to respondents, a majority o f coaches ( 75%) do not have performance
clauses in their contracts: 25% constitutes a significant number, however, that do have
clauses that can result in their losing their jobs i f their teams do not win. This is enough
to pose majors problems for institutional control.
The same question was asked o f AD's concerning performance clauses in the
contracts o f Olympic sports coaches. The data in Table 12 indicates that some Olympics
sports coaches did have performance clauses in their contracts.
Table 12: Performance clauses for Olympic Sports Coaches
Question: "Do the contracts o f Olympic sports coaches ( tennis, soccer, golf, etc ) contain
athletics performance clauses that could cause the contracts to be
non-renewed?"
Response
Frequency
Percent

Yes
24
17%

No
118
83%

Totals
142
100%

The survey responses indicated that fewer Olympic sports coaches have contracts
containing performance clauses that can result in non-renewal. However. 17®o still
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represents a significant number o f coaches who face losing their jobs i f they fail to have
a winning team.
Another area that is important to institutional control o f athletics concerns
whether or not the athletics director makes it clear that he or she demands compliance
with NCAA regulations. The data collected showed that this is not a problem. Almost all
o f chief executive officers (99%) and athletics directors (98% ) indicated that the AD at
their institution does make it clear that he or she demands compliance with NCAA rules
and that they w ill not tolerate those who deliberately violate the rules or do so through
gross negligence.
Also important to the matter o f institutional control o f athletics is the attitude o f
a school's athletics director about its educational goals. Kjeldsen ( 1992) stated that
presidents must actively participate in athletic governance by holding athletics directors
accountable for contributing to the educational goals and principles o f the university.
Here too the responses were almost unanimous; 99® o o f CEO's indicated that they believe
that the athletics director at their institution agrees with the educational goals o f the
school. In the same way, the attitude o f the coaches toward their schools' educational
goals is important. Again, the data showed no problem at all in this area.
Questions designed to determine i f coaches have a clear understanding of their
role within the university, if they understand and adhere to NCAA rules, and if they are
committed to NCAA rules compliance were asked in the questionnaire. The responses
indicated that there were no problems felt to exist in these areas.
Table 13 shows the responses by athletics directors asked to name the greatest
threat to institutional control at their schools. The most frequently identified threat was
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boosters: it was listed 37 times as the greatest threat to the institutional control o f
athletics. Better education and educational brochures and guides for boosters, coaches,
and students were mentioned as the best methods to lesson the impact o f this threat.
Better monitonng and enforcement procedures were mentioned five times frequently as
other suggested methods.
Table 13: Threats to the Control o f Athletics
Question (to AD's): "What is the greatest threat to institutional control o f athletics at
vour institution?"
Response
Boosters
Agents
External Force
Monev. Funding. Resources
Coaches
Alumni
NCAA & Regulations
Staff
Winning at All Costs
Athletes
Lack of Compliance Staff
Regents
Lack of Understanding
Gambling
Media
The President
Faculty
Totals

Frequency
37
17
14
12
10
8
5
5
4
4
3
3
3
2
2
1
1
131

Percent
28%
13%
11%
9%
8%
6%
4%
4%
3%
3%
2%
2%
2%
2%
2%
1%
1%
100%

Professional agents were the second most frequently identified threat to the
institutional control o f athletics. Better education, educational brochures and guides for
coaches and students was mentioned by everyone as a method to lesson the impact o f this
threat on institutional control. A few athletics directors mentioned working closely with
the NC AA and their respective state governments on registration of agents programs.
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Better compliance, monitoring, and enforcement policies were also mentioned as good
methods
Another open-ended question designed to gather comments from AD's asked
them to identify strategies that they have used to establish or reestablish the institutional
control o f athletics? The responses are tabulated in Table 14.
Table 14; Strategies to Establish Control
Question (to AD's): "Name three strategies that you have used to establish or reestablish
institutional control o f athletics. "
Response
Education
Compliance
Athletic Department
'olicy. Procedures. Goals
Audits. Reviews, etc.
Hinng & Firing
Athletics Council
^resident
Athletics Director
-inancial
Communication
Conference & NCAA
Coaches
Board of Regents
Administration
"acuity Athletics Rep
Contracts
ISÎâi___________________

Frequency
53
47
25
24
23
12
10
9
8
a
6
5
3
3
3
2
2
243

Percent
22%
19%
10%
10%
9%
5%
4%
4%
3%
3%
2%
2%
1%
1%
1%
1%
1%
100%

The most commonly named strateg)'. listed 53 times, was education. Specific
educational activities named included: reviewing rules and regulations with staff and
coaches: reinforcing the need for compliance: stressing rules and regulations with student
athletes: educating about and stressing the goals, missions, and rules expectations:
educating the facult\ athletics representative: educating the boosters and alumni: using
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educational pamphlets, programs and mandatory seminars; holding regular meetings with
the faculty athletics board; arranging professional improvement seminars; and writing
reminders o f

Can Do" and "Cannot Do" to boosters and alumni.

The second most frequently listed strateg} used by athletics directors to establish
or reestablish institutional control was the compliance office which was listed 47 times.
Specific activities named in this area were vaned; they included: developing a strong
compliance office emphasizing institutional control: scrutinizing applicable rules more
closely: committing support to the compliance officer, conducting compliance audits:
maintaining compliance records detailing recruiting, fund raising, playing seasons, and
practice sessions activities: employing a full time compliance officer directing functions
and education o f coaches, staff, alumni, and boosters: implementing compliance policies
and procedures: detailing a checks and balance system: emphasizing importance of the
office: improving the monitoring program: making every one a part o f the compliance
team: and using technology to monitor management and rules compliance.

The Chief Executive Officer
A t the heart o f institutional control o f athletics is the chief executive officer. It is
the CEO whom the NCAA has identified as the person ultimately responsible for control.
The Knight Commission (1991) stated that presidents have a responsibility to act (p. 181)
while Kjeldsen ( 1982) declared that it is the presidents on whom improvement in
intercollegiate athletics depends. Many others have also called for presidents to take
action to assert control of athletics (ACE, 1979: Hartford, 1976: Lapchick, 1987: Smith,
1988: Thelin, 1989. 1994).
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First and foremost, the CEO must make it clear that he or she demands
compliance with NCAA rules and regulations and w ill not tolerate those who \iolate
those rules either deliberately or through gross negligence. Almost all survey
respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that they do so Howev er, the survey also
showed that in many cases, it is not the chief executive officer who directly supervises
the school’s athletics directors; 39® o of AD's and 45“ o o f CEO's identified someone other
than the school's CEO as the direct supervisor o f the athletics director. In those cases, it
is possible that the strength of the CEO's demands regarding strict rules compliance is
diluted to some degree by the fact of an intermediate supervisor.
Like the AD's. the chief executive officers were asked to identify the greatest
threat to institutional control of athletics at their institution. Their responses are shown
in Table 15:
Table 15: Threats to Control o f Athletics
Question (to CEO):

"What is the greatest threat to institutional control of athletics at
vour institution?
Response
Boosters
Monev. Fundino. Resources
Coaches
Agents
External Force
Staff
NCAA & Regulations
Athletes
Winning at All Costs
Television
Alumni
Regents
Lack of Understanding
Faculty

Frequency
22
16
9
9
4
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
1

Percent
27%
20%
11%
11%
5%
4%
4%
2%
2%
2%
2%
2%
2%
1%
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Athletics Director
Compliance
Lack of Compliance Staff
Media
Athletics Department
Totals

1
1
1
1
1
82

1%
1%
1%
1%
1%
100%

The CEO's, like the athletics directors, identified boosters as the greatest threat to
the institutional control o f athletics. Specifically identified were those boosters who are
overzealous with no personal risk at stake, who are uneducated and uninformed about
NCA A rules and regulations, who interfere, who want to win at all costs, who are
renegade supporters, who involve themselves in improper relations with students and
coaches, and who are out o f control.
Better education and educational brochures and guides for boosters, coaches, and
students were named as the best methods to lessen the impact o f this threat. Other
suggestions included consolidating all boosters groups and placing them under the
control of the institution, requiring that all booster funds be deposited under the
budgetary control o f the institution, conducting periodic audits of expenditures,
strengthening procedures for monitoring and enforcement, and stating policies more
clearly. Also, two chief executive officers stressed the need for a strong athletics director
with a high level of integrity as key to controlling the threat that boosters can pose.
The CEO's, again like the AD's. identified money-related issues as the second
greatest threat to institutional control. Specific circumstances named were lack of
adequate financial resources, loss o f fiscal integrity , increases in dependence on external
financial support from boosters, budget difficulties, cost increases, the need to produce
income, lack o f institutional fundin a. and the areed o f a small number of Division 1A
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institutions. The actions recommended by the CEO's to lessen the impact on control
were tightening o f fiscal controls: establishing a balance between self-generated revenue
and institutional funds: better promoting o f events: generating more revenue: gaining
support from alumni, corporations and boosters: earmarking all income for athletic
grants-in-aid: and improving fund raising.
CEO's w ere asked what percentage o f control they had over the athletics program
at their institution. The mode was 100“ o having been selected by 74° o o f the respondents
revealing that a sizable majority o f CEO's felt that they have complete control over their
athletics program. An additional 21% selected either 95° o or 90% level o f control.
Table 16 shows that the most common strategy named by chief executive officers
to establish or reestablish institutional control, listed 43 times, related to the athletics
director, most commonly to the appointment o f the AD (mentioned 18 times». Comments
in this regard ranged from noting the importance o f hiring a strong athletics director, to
hiring one w ho supports the overall mission o f the institution, who is competent, w ho is
in clear agreement with the CEO on goals and standards, who understands athletics must
be managed as a business, who has integrity, w ho is a leader, or w ho shares the CEO's
values. The reporting line o f the athletics director was mentioned eleven times: the
comment o f all eleven CEO's who specified this was that the athletics director should
report directly to the CEO.
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Table 16: Strategies to Establish Control
Question (to CEO's): "Name three strategies that you have used to establish control o f
athletics."
Response
Athletics Director
Compliance
Policy. Procedures. Goals
Financial
Athletics Council
President
Audits, Reviews, etc.
Education
Communication
Faculty Athletics Rep
Hiring & Firing
Boosters
Conferences and NCAA
Contracts
Board of Regents
Coaches
Athletics Department
Totals

Frequency
43
19
19
16
15
12
12
10
10
9
9
7
5
5
4
3
3
201

Percent
21%
9%
9%
8%
7%
6%
6%
5%
5%
4%
4%
3%
2%
2%
2%
1%
1%
100%

The data in Table 16 shows that the second most common strategy used by chief
executive officers to establish or reestablish institutional control was compliance related.
Compliance-related strategies were listed 19 times: specific actions listed included
adding a full time compliance officer, making sure the executive council fully supports
institutional control, and taking swift action when needed. Other comments related to
developing a strong compliance office emphasizing institutional control, constant
reinforcing o f policy, encouraging broad-based participation, implementing strong
monitoring policies, and establishing accountability.
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Financial & Operational Policies
Various financial and operational policies have been identified as potential
influences on the institutional control o f athletics. According to a study conducted by
Mitchell Raibom ( 1974). the budgetary process was considered valuable to the planning
and control o f athletic operations by 84° o o f all respondents in his study.
An operational policy that includes self-study and evaluation o f the intercollegiate
athletics programs is considered a necessity by the N C A A which mandates such an
undertaking for member institutions at least once every five years ( NCAA Manual 19979 8 ). The results o f this study indicate that the majority o f institutions conduct
comprehensive self-studies and do so at least once every five years. However. 8°o o f
CEO's and 6% o f AD's reported that their schools did not conduct such a self-study and
evaluation.
An external peer review o f the athletics program has been identified by the
NCAA as a method to gauge the level o f institutional control over the athletics
department. The N C A A states:
The involvement in the certification program o f peer reviewers who are
external to the institution is designed to verity and evaluate the
methodology and results o f the institutional self-study. Peer reviewers
shall verify that the self-study process was characterized by campus-wide
participation and that the self-study report reflects accurately the
operation o f the athletics program. Peer reviewers also shall evaluate the
institution's athletic program in relation to a set o f fundamental operating
principles " ( NCAA Manual. 1997-98. p. 47).
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In response to the survey, l9 “ o o f AD's and 13% o f CEO's said that their schools have not
conducted external peer rev iews o f the athletics program.
Another policy element o f institutional control is based on an institution hav ing
an articulated set o f goals concerning the athletics program. According to Thelin ( 1989),
presidents face a serious confusion o f roles in matters o f athletics policy and
administration. To solve this problem, he said, "Each institution should clearly define its
purpose and should incorporate this definition into a statement as a pronouncement o f its
role in the educational world" (p. 96). The results o f the study showed that the majority
o f institutions have a set o f goals concerning the athletics program; however. ll° o of
.AD's and 7% o f CEO's reported that their institutions do not.
Admissions and academic policies are another area o f concern.

Michener ( 1976 )

reported that "the temptation to recruit young men skilled at games but totally unfitted
for academic work is overpowering" (p. 189). A former CEO o f Harvard University.
Derek Bok {1983). expressed the opinion that some universities were admitting more and
more athletes whose educational backgrounds and aptitudes were so low that they have
little chance o f academic success. Athletes, said Simon ( 1985 ), should also be students
who are academically qualified to be in the university, who make satisfactory academic
progress, and who graduate with meaningful academic skills. The NCAA has mandated
that "intercollegiate athletics programs shall be maintained as a vital component o f the
educational program, and student-athletes shall be an integral part of the student body.
The admission, academic standing, and academic progress o f student-athletes shall be
consistent with the policies and standards adopted by the institution for the student body
in general" ( NCAA Manual 1997-98. p. 4). However, as indicated by the figures in
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Table 17. a significant number o f institutions may not be complying with this directive
since 2U°o o f A D ’s and 13% o f C EO ’s reported that athletes at their schools are not
expected to meet the same admissions requirements as the general student body.
Table 17; Admission Requirements for Athletes
Question; "Are all athletes expected to meet the same admission requirements as the
iieneral student bodv?"

Athletics Director
Chief Executive Officer

Response
Frequency
Percent
Frequency
Percent

Yes
115
80%
87
87%

No
29
20%
13
13%

Totals
144
100%
100
100%

According to Hardy and Berryman ( 1982). colleges and athletics have frequently
lacked clearly defined goals regarding athletics; Scott ( 1982) also observed that
institutions need to clarity their philosophy and objectives concerning athletics. Most
respondents to the survey confirmed that their schools have clearly articulated mission
statements pertaining to the role o f athletics; 3% o f AD's and 8° o o f CEO’s replied that
their schools do not have mission statements concerning the role o f athletics.
Another element which can influence institutional control relates to the
establishment o f an athletics board. The function o f a faculty athletics board or
committee according to Sack [ 1982). is to give priority to the educational needs o f
student athletes; athletic competition, he maintained, should be limited to schools that
are equal ly committed to the educational model o f sport. Most respondents ( 9 1° o o f
CEO's and 94% o f AD's ) confirmed that an athletics board has been established at their
schools
However, the role o f the board is limited to an advisorv one accordinu to the
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majority o f respondents — 83° o o f CEO’s and 81 ° o o f A D ’s. Frey (1982) criticized
institutions that have advisory-only committees as did Thelin ( 1989) who summed up the
objection by saving that a board without authority to make decisions was like playing
basketball without keeping score.
Table 18: Role o f the Board
Question: Is the role o f the board advisorv oniv?

Chief Executive Officer
Athletics Director

Response
Frequency
Percent
Frequency
Percent

No
26

Yes
114

19%

81%
17

85
83%

17%

Totals
140
100%
102
100%

Another element that impacts institutional control is the level o f financial support
provided to the athletics department to be considered self sufficient. Riley and Baldridge
( 1977) and Nyquist (1979) have charged that universities have pushed athletic
departments into external partnerships because institutional budgets for athletics have not
kept pace with costs which have steadily increased and have even doubled in as little as
ten years. Athletic departments have had to seek revenue from external groups, who. in
turn, desire control (A tw ell, Crimes & Lopiano. 1980). According to Frey ( 1994).
"External coalitions provide the resources necessary to maintain the department's
operational livelihood and to keep it from being a resource drain on the larger
organization " ( p. 6).
The figures in Table 19 indicate that almost half o f the institutions did not
provide enough financial support to the athletics department for it to be considered self
sufficient. This implies that the other half o f the institutions find it necessary to turn to
other sources including those outside o f the university in order to obtain the funds that
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are necessary to support their athletics programs. Table 20 presents the data concerning
the percentage o f the annual athletics budget that was reported to have come from
institutional or state funds and the percentage that came from other funding.
Table 19: Financial Support to the Athletics Department
Statement:

"Your institution provides enough financial support to the athletics
department for it to be considered self-sufficient."

Response
Frequency
Athletics Director
Percent
Chief Executive Officer Frequency
Percent

Strongly
Agree
Agree
44
20
14%
32%
9
35
9%
34%

Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
46
17
11
33%
12%
8%
36
14
8
14%
35%
8%

Totals
138
100%
102
100%

Table 20: Percentage o f Athletics Budget from Institutional or State Funds
Question ( asked o f CEO's ):

"What percentage o f the athletic budget comes from
institutional anchor state funds?"

Percentage of Budget Frequency
0
14
90%
14
80%
13
30%
11
40%
9
20%
8
70%
8
60%
7
10%
5
50%
4
100%
4
5%
1
25%
1
45%
1
Totals
100

Percent
14%
14%
13%
11%
9%
8%
8%
7%
5%
4%
4%
1%
1%
1%
100%

The chief executive officers reported that an average o f 49% o f their annual
athletics budget comes from institutional anchor state funds. The conclusion follows that
the remaining 51° 0 o f the athletics budget, on average, comes from other sources o f
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funding — either successful athletic programs or successful donation drives.
Another element o f institutional control is whether the institution conducts an
independent financial audit o f the athletics department at least once a year. The NCAA
has mandated that;
A ll expenditures for or in behalf o f a Division I member institution's
intercollegiate athletics program, including those by any outside
organization, agency or group o f individuals, shall be subject to an annual
financial audit conducted for the institution by a qualified auditor who is
not a staff member o f the institution and who is selected either by the
institution's ch ief executive officer or by an institutional administrator
from outside the athletics department designated by the chief executive
officer (N C A A 1997-98 Division 1 Manual, p. 48).
The responses to the questionnaire indicated that almost all o f the institutions conduct an
independent financial audit o f the athletics department at least once a year: only I “ o of
AD's and 2° o o f CEO's reported that this was not done.
Another circumstance that affects institutional control exists when a foundation
whose control is external to the institution provides monetary support to the athletics
program. A popular solution to financial problems is to solicit donations from outside
sources (Frey. 1982; Thelin. 1989). Thelin reported that these foundations, associations,
and fund-raising groups exist with lim ited accountability to the host institution. Sperber
( 1990 ) also has reported that booster clubs have "an amazing degree o f autonomy from
the university ' ( p. 74). In addition, according to Frey, booster clubs have tended to move
athletics increasingly a wav from academic and educational concerns. The results o f this
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study showed that those athletics programs which were provided with monetary support
by foundations whose control is external to the institution were a minority. Nevertheless,
there were enough o f them to pose a potential problem. Table 21 presents the data
concerning external foundations.
Table 21 : Monetary Support from External Foundations
Question; "Do external foundations provide monetary support?"

Athletics Director
Chief Executive Officer

Response
Frequency
Percent
Frequency
Percent

Yes
42
29%
38
36%

No
101
71%
67
64%

Totals
143
100%
105
100%

Another element o f institutional control concerns the establishment o f
informational and educational programs for student-athletes regarding the rules that they
must follow. These programs are needed, according to Sack (1979), because "athletes
are expected to handle the same course loads and to maintain the same academic
standards as regular college students. It is not surprising, given the strains inherent in the
scholar- athlete role, that athletes have been found to be more likely than regular students
to cheat, to take easy courses, and to seek out other academic short cuts” (p. 60). Table
22 presents the data on whether informational and educational programs for studentathletes regarding rules that thev must follow have been established.
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Table 22: Educational Programs for Student-Athletes
Question:

"Are informational and educational programs regarding the rules established
for student-athletes?"

Response
Frequency
Percent

Strongly
Agree
94
90%

Agree
48
10%

Neutral
2
0%

Totals
143
100%

The data in Table 22 indicates that the majority (90°o) o f institutions have
established informational and educational programs for student-athletes regarding the
rules that they must follow. Ten percent, unfortunately, have not done so.
The NCAA requires that institutions have in place procedures for self-reporting
NCAA violations (NCAA Guide to Rules Compliance 1997-98). Almost all AD's
reported that their institutions identify and report to the N C A A instances in which
compliance has not been achieved.
The NCAA has recommended that an internal monitoring system be instituted in
order to ensure compliance with N C A A rules (Principles o f Institutional Control as
Prepared bv the NCAA Committee on Infractions. 1996) Again, responses showed that
almost all institutions had a comprehensive monitonng program to ensure rules
compliance.
Institutions are required by the NCAA to have a meaningful compliance
education program provided for personnel engaged in athletics-related operations
( Principles o f Institutional Control as Prepared bv the N CA A Committee on Infractions.
1996). Survey results indicated that almost all institutions had a comprehensive N C A A rules-and- regulations education program for the athletics department
Although the NCAA has not mandated that Division I institutions have a full time
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compliance officer, it places the burden o f proof on institutions "to demonstrate control
o f their athletics programs and the effectiveness o f compliance systems with concrete
examples o f implementation and effectively functioning compliance systems" ( Principles
o f Institutional Control: NCAA Guide to Rules Compliance, p. 6). The Principles o f
Institutional Control, as prepared by the N C A A Committee on Infractions, lists examples
o f lack o f institutional control related to personnel responsible for compliance. These
examples are as follows:
1.

A person with compliance responsibilities fails to establish a proper
system for compliance or fails to monitor the operations o f a compliance
system appropriately.

2.

A person with compliance responsibilities does not take steps to alter the
system o f compliance when there are indications the system is not
working.

3

A supervisor with overall responsibility for compliance, in assigning
duties to subordinates, so divides responsibilities that, as a practical
matter, no one is, or appears to be. directly in charge.

4.

Compliance duties are assigned to a subordinate who lacks sufficient
authority to have the confidence or respect o f others

These examples indicate that the responsibility for compliance should belong to one
person who does not share coaching responsibilities. This study indicates that this is the
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case at the majority o f institutions: however, 16% o f AD ’s and 18% o f CEO's responded
that their schools did not have a full-time compliance officer.

Boosters & Alum ni
A difficult element o f controlling the intercollegiate athletics program concerns
the involvement o f alumni and boosters. Sperber ( 1990) indicated that the booster
problem is worse than ever: "It's become especially acute because institutions must
attempt to obtain financial support from booster organizations and then worry about
turning over control o f their programs to these same people” (p. 79). Hart-Nibbrig and
Cottingham (1989) have also said that the influence o f boosters is difficult to control.
This is easy to understand because, according to Frey ( 1982). a unit which does not have
the support o f the booster element does not usually survive politically or economically: if
a booster organization can provide the money, then it can also command some power in
athletic decision making.

In fact, according to Sperber ( 1990). any effort to control the

booster groups has been largely superficial since the need for the resources these groups
provide is so great: "Boosters are usually can-do business types and the distinction
between ethical conduct and succeeding by any means is often unclear to them. When
this syndrome is combined with their sense of ownership of a college sports team and
their desire to see that team win at any cost, they ignore NCAA and all other rules” (p.
79).
Despite the difficulty in controlling external groups or individuals, such as
boosters and alumni, the N C A A has mandated that the institutions are responsible for
these groups. The 1997-98 NCAA Manual states that" an institution's "responsibility "
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for the conduct o f its intercollegiate athletics program shall include responsibility for the
acts o f an independent agency or organization when a member o f the institution's
executive or athletics administration, or an athletics department staff member, has
knowledge that such agency or organization is promoting the institution s intercollegiate
athletics program" (NCAA Manual. 1997-98, p. 49).
A place to start when considering booster involvement in athletics is to determine
i f the boosters and alumni o f an institution are supportive o f presidential authority This
support cannot be assumed considering the need for money at many institutions and the
control that could be ceded to receive that money (Frey, 1982).
Table 23; Boosters and Alumni Support o f Presidential Authority

Response
Frequency
Percent
Chief Executive Officer Frequency
Percent

Athletics Director

Strongly
Agree
70
49%
48
45%

Strongly
Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree
1
60
13
0
9%
1%
0%
42%
2
1
48
8
7%
2%
1%
45%

Totals
144
100%
107
100%

The figures in Table 23 show that a majority o f both chief executive officers and
athletics directors agreed that boosters and alumni o f their institution are supportive o f
presidential authonty : 90% o f presidents and 91 ° o o f athletics directors either strongly
agreed or agreed that boosters and alumni o f their institution are supportive o f
presidential authority.
Even if boosters and alumni are supportive o f presidential authority, are they
necessarily committed to NCAA rules education and compliance? Hart-Nibbrig and
Cottingham ( 1989 ) reported many violations o f NCA A rules initiated by boosters; these
included giving money to players according to their performance on the field, paying the
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college costs o f the sisters o f a potential recruit, supplying the use o f an apartment to a
recruit at a reduced rent, providing free room and board for recruits; providing
transportation for recruits, and offering money in exchange for a letter o f intent to attend
a university. Sperber ( 1990) has stated that the stories o f boosters giving recruits and
college athletes illegal gifts are legion. He reported that in the history o f the NCAA's
policing o f intercollegiate athletics, almost h a lf o f the approximately two thousand
penalties have involved boosters abetting coaches in various violations ( p. 79). The
results o f this study showed that a majority o f chief e.xecutive officers and athletics
directors either strongly agreed (45°o and 37% respectively) or agreed (45°o and 54%)
that boosters and alumni o f their institution are committed to N C A A rules education and
compliance. Although almost no one disagreed with the statement concerning booster
and alumni commitment, a relatively large group o f both CEO's (8 “o) and AD's 1 15%)
were undecided about the issue. This may be interpreted as indicating a degree of
concern about the actual level o f booster and alumni commitment to rules education and
compliance.
Another question relating to boosters and alumni concerns the establishment of
informational and educational programs in order to inform athletics boosters o f the
limitations on their activities under NCAA rules and o f the penalties that can arise i f they
are responsible for rule violations. The N C A A has recommended that such informational
and educational programs be established ( Principles o f Institutional Control as Prepared
bv the NCAA Committee on Infractions. 1996). Response to this question was
definitive: 96% o f respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that such programs had
been established at their schools.
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On a related issue, the N C A A has mandated that an institution is responsible for
the acts o f an independent agency or organization promoting the institution's
intercollegiate athletics program ( NCA A Manual. 1997-98). I f the institution is
responsible for the actions o f external foundations or booster groups, then it is relevant
for the institution to determine i f these organizations exist; 29° o o f AD's and 36*^ o o f
CEO's replied that these external organizations exist at their schools. Thelin ( 1994 )
reported that these foundations, associations, and fund-raising groups exist with lim ited
accountability to the host institution. Unfortunately, these organizations, with their
limited accountability , have gotten their institutions in trouble for various N C A A rules
violations (Simon. 1985. p. 127).
Since the schools are responsible for the actions o f these external foundations, an
attempt should be made to bring these organizations under the control o f the institution.
A t a minimum, attempts at education for these external booster groups should be made in
order to relate the potential problems facing the school i f N C A A rules are violated.
Hart-Nibbng and Cottingham ( 1989) have stated that to the extent that
universities must appeal to the public for funds, they can hardly resolve the systematic
pressures associated with intercollegiate athletics. Frey (1982) stated that "the truth o f
the matter is that presidents, faculty, and students will always lose the control battle
because they do not have the resources to compete with those available to the booster
coalition" (p. 225 ). External funds are necessary for athletics programs because
legislative appropnations. university budgets, and gate receipts do not provide sufficient
funds for a high-level program (A tw ell, 1980; Frey, 1982). The results o f this studyshowed that the majority o f institutions rely on funds generated from boosters and
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alumni. This is shown in Tables 24 and 25;
Table 24; Monetary Support from External Athletics Foundations
Question; "Do external foundations provide monetary support to the athletic program?'

Athletics Director
Chief Executive Officer

Response
Frequency
Percent
Frequency
Percent

Yes
31

No
111

22%
32

78%
74

30%

70%

Totals
142
100%
106
100%

Table 25; Funds Generated from Boosters and Alumni
Statement;

"The athletic department relies on funds generated from boosters and
alumni.”

Response
Frequency
Percent
Chief Executive Officer Frequency
Percent

Athletics Director

Strongly
Agree
29
20%
17
16%

Strongly
Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Totals
144
52
10
44
9
7%
6%
100%
36%
31%
107
36
5
37
12
11%
100%
34%
5%
35%

Do boosters and alumni o f institutions expect the athletics department to have
winning programs? Funk (1991) stated that coaches are under intense pressure from
alumni to produce victories (p. 89). This pressure could cause some coaches to use any
means to secure victories. Table 26 presents the related data.
Table 26; Expectations o f Boosters and Alumni
Statement; "Boosters and alumni expect to have winning programs. "

Athletics Director
Chief Executive Officer

Response
Frequency
Percent
Frequency
Percent

Strongly
Strongly
Agree
Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Totals
144
7
1
40
3
93
100%
1%
28%
65%
5%
2%
1
1
102
29
69
2
1%
100%
1%
28%
68%
2%

Guttman ( 1988) contended that alumni, who are not always concerned with
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excellence in the classroom, have been known to give generously to purchase athletic
greamess: it is common knowledge, he said, that alumni and state legislators are more
generous to their alma mater when the football team has done well (p. 73). Survey
respondents were split on the issue o f whether or not boosters and alumni would
contribute to a losing program. Although over half felt that boosters would contribute
regardless o f the programs success. 2 l “o o f A D ’s and 22^o o f CEO’s felt that the
contributions relied on a winning program. A substantial number (20% and 22° o) neither
agreed or disagreed indicating again an uncertainty or ambivalence about boosters.
Table 27: Booster & Alumni Contributions
Statement: "Boosters and alumni w ill not contribute unless the athletic programs win."

Athletics Director
Chief Executive Officer

Strongly
Strongly
Response Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree
Frequency
3
28
29
77
7
Percent
2%
19%
20%
53%
5%
Frequency
23
2
21
8
52
Percent
2%
20%
22%
49%
8%

Totals
144
100%
106
100%

Funk ( 1991 ) reported that coaches are under intense pressure from alumni to
produce victories. Lapchick ( 1996) declared that the number one rule that mattered was
winning: the coaches who followed this rule, he said, stayed at their schools for long
periods o f time — no one pointed a finger at the coaches unless they lost. Hart-Nibbrig
and Cottingham ( 1989) pointed out that even at the Ivy League universities, coaches can
be fired for sustaining a losing tradition. Primary sources o f this widespread pressure to
w in are boosters and alumni. This is reflected in the study results which showed that
only 30°'o of CEO's and 32% A D 's disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement
that boosters and alumni o f an institution expect coaches with losing records to be fired.
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Once again, a sizable number o f respondents (29°o and 33% ) indicated uncertainty or
indecision by choosing to remain "neutral."
Table 28; Boosters Expectations Regarding Coaches
Statement:

"Boosters and alumni o f your institution expect coaches with losing
records to be fired."

Athletics Director
Chief Executive Officer

Response
Frequency
Percent
Frequency
Percent

Strongly
Strongly
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree
41
48
6
4
45
4%
33%
28%
3%
31%
29
3
38
31
5
27%
3%
29%
5%
36%

Totals
144
100%
106
100%

Summary
The results o f this study indicated that governing boards, chief executive officers,
and athletics directors were taking steps to support institutional control o f Division 1
athletics. Most governing boards had written mission statements in which they have
defined the role o f athletics at their school: they had also articulated the authonty o f the
chief executive officer in a mission statement and are supportive o f that authority as were
the athletics directors.
CEO's and AD's have been making it clear that they demand compliance with
NCAA rules. The institutions have been conducting independent financial audits o f the
athletics department, establishing faculty athletics boards, creating clearly articulated
mission statements concerning the role o f athletics, creating articulated sets o f goals
concerning the athletic program, conducting peer reviews o f the athletics department,
and conducting comprehensive self-study and evaluation o f the athletics program. The
CEO's have also separated the Athletics Directors from coaching responsibilities for the
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majority o f institutions.
Comprehensive NCAA rules-education programs have been established as have
informational and educational programs for boosters and student-athletes. Monitoring
programs have been set up to ensure that rules compliance has been established and
institutions have identified and reported to the N C A A instances in which compliance has
not been achieved.
Despite these successes in the institutional control o f athletics, there were areas
o f concern that were identified by this study.
Pressures to W in. There were a number o f pressures placed on coaches to have
winning and successful programs. The data in Table 3 showed that governing boards
expect athletics departments to have winning programs. Data in Table 6 and Table 7
reflected the fact that athletics directors expected coaches to have winning programs as
their highest priority and Table 31 showed that boosters and alumni also expect the
athletics department to have winning programs.
The fact that governing boards, athletics directors, and boosters expected coaches
to have winning programs does not necessarily mean that coaches will cheat. However.
It did reflect pressure on a coach to win. Combined with other influences, it could add to
the temptation for a coach to cheat to win.
The results o f the study also indicated that the athletics directors and coaches felt
that the stability their position depends on having winning programs. The data in Table 8
show ed that a large number o f athletics directors believed the stability of their position
depends on having winning programs. Tables 9 and 10 indicated that Olympic sports
coaches as well as football and basketball coaches believe the stability of their positions
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depends on having a winning program That belief is easy to understand — the data in
Table 26 indicated that boosters and alumni o f an institution expect coaches with losing
records to be fired. On top o f that, as the information in Tables 11 and 12 showed the
contracts o f some coaches contain athletics-performance clauses that could cause the
contracts to be non-renewed. Such clauses increase the nsk that coaches might feel
enough pressure to do anything to win.
On the one hand, CEO's and A D 's educate and expect coaches to follow NCAA
rules. On the other hand there is substantial pressure on coaches to have winning
programs. W ill the coach be fired for breaking NCAA rules — or for losing? This is a
dilemma that not only causes problems for coaches but for the concept o f institutional
control o f athletics as well.
Reliance on External Funds: Another issue raised by the data in this study was
the reliance on external monies to help fund the activities o f the athletics departments.
The data in Table 25 indicated that athletics departments rely to a great extent on funds
generated from boosters and alumni. Also, as the information in Table 19 showed half
o f the respondents indicated that their institution did not provide enough financial
support to the athletics department for it to be considered self sufficient. More
specifically, the data in Tables 20 and 21 showed that CEO's and A D's agreed that only
half o f the athletics department budget came from the institution. This implies that the
other half came from external funding.
Athletics finance was a concern for the chief executive officer. The data in
Table 15 showed that CEO's rate money, funding, resources, and financing as the second
greatest threat to institutional control. Inadequate financial resources, dependence on
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financial support from boosters, budget difficulties, cost increases, the need to produce
income, and the lack o f institutional funding were all identified as threats to institutional
control.
The methods recommended by CEO’s to reduce the impact o f finance-related
concerns on athletic control included establishing a balance between self-generated
revenue and institutional funds: improving o f events promotion: generating more
revenue: gaining support from alumni, corporations, and boosters: and improving fund
raising. However, the suggested solutions create a paradox — the solution to one
problem creates another. The NCAA has mandated that an institution is responsible for
the acts o f an independent agency or organization promoting the school’s intercollegiate
athletics program ( NCAA Manual. 1997-98). Nevertheless, the data in Tables 21.24.
and 25 showed that some external athletic foundations or booster organizations not under
the direct control o f their institution do exist in order to support and provide money to
the institution. The paradox consists o f how to satisfy the need for financial help from
boosters and alumni on one hand while also keeping external forces from either
controlling or causing the institution trouble by breaking NCAA rules.
Faculty Athletics Board: Survey results showed that the majontv o f institutions
have either a board that is in control o f athletics or an athletics advisory board. However,
the data in Tables 18 and 19 also showed that the role o f the board is advisory only.
Institutions cannot expect their faculty to help with the control o f athletics if they do not
allow the faculty board to have authority beyond the merely advisory role.
Admitting Student-Athletes Under Different Criteria: The N C A A has mandated
that "intercollegiate athletics programs shall be maintained as a vital component of the
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educational program, and student-athletes shall be an integral part o f the student body.
The admission, academic standing, and academic progress o f student-athletes shall be
consistent with the policies and standards adopted by the institution for the student body
in general" ( NCAA Manual 1997-98. p. 4). However, the data in Table 17 showed 13%
o f the chief executive officers and 24% o f the athletics directors said their institutions
did admit athletes under different requirements as the general student body. This policy
could signal that the institution treats athletes on a different standard than regular
students.
While the status o f a number o f the areas looked at in the study proved to be
satisfactory, other areas were shown to need improving i f institutional control o f athletics
is to become a realitv at all NCAA Division I schools.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER 5

SU M M A R Y OF FIND IN G S A N D R EC O M M EN D A TIO N S
FOR FURTHER S TU D Y

Introduction
The purpose of this investigation was to determine the current status o f
institutional control of athletics at N C A A Division I colleges and universities and to
determine w here problems with control lie. This was done through the use o f a sur\ ey
designed to collect information pertaining to the individual elements and conditions that
have been determined to impact on self-govemance. These include the actions and
policies o f the chief executive officer who is the person ultimately responsible for control
of the institution intercollegiate athletics. They also include certain actions and beliefs
by the institution’s governing board, its athletics director, and its boosters and alumni. In
addition, financial and operational policies o f the institution can affect the control of
athletics.
A questionnaire was mailed to the CEO's and AD's o f the 275 NCAA Division 1
schools listed in the 1996-97 National Directory o f Colleue Athletics. The results from
the returned surveys were presented and analyzed in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 summarizes
the findings derived from the results o f this study and the implications for institutional

113
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control o f athletics. It also suggests further studies in the area o f institutional control o f
athletics.
Implications
The findings o f this study pointed out a number o f implications concerning the
institutional control o f athletics as it relates to the NCAA which instituted the concept in
an effort to attain its ultimate goal o f compliance with its rules and regulations. The
survey results indicated that there are weaknesses in the exercise o f institutional control
that can be addressed in order to strengthen control at a number o f institutions.
The governing board and its actions affect the exercise o f institutional control in
several important areas. The boards at some schools still need to take action to support
institutional control by writing mission statements clearly defining the role o f athletics
and endorsing the authoritv o f the CEO concerning athletics. Governing boards must
also take action to define their expectations concerning the athletics program and to
decide what amount o f money is needed to meet those expectations.
CEO’s should encourage their boards to take these steps if they have not already
done so. In addition, before taking a new position as CEO. the candidate should ensure
that a mission statement addressing these concerns exists and that it is clearly worded
and realistic. Care should be taken not only that expectations are defined and are
realistic but that sufficient funds are budgeted so that goals and expectations can
reasonably be accomplished. If this is not the case, the implication for the CEO’s is that
they may be in a position in which the control o f athletics and NCAA rules compliance
for which they are responsible is difficult or impossible.
The study results indicated that governing boards expected institutions to have
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winning programs: at the same tim e, most programs were shown to be underfunded

In

addition, it was indicated that approximately 50®b o f annual budgets for athletics came
from external funding, a situation that leaves the institution in the position o f being
compromised by external organizations including boosters and alumni who may seek to
exercise a degree o f control o f the athletic programs to which they contribute. CEO's in
the study identified funding-related issues as a primary threat to their institutional
control The CEO would be w ell advised to avoid or to take actions to alleviate those
situations where there are conflicts between expectations and funding o f athletics
programs.
The study revealed the good news that coaches are expected to follow the rules
dictated by the NCAA, and their education in this regard was the most common strategv
used in efforts to establish institutional control o f athletics. Unfortunately, the study
indicated that these same coaches are frequently under a great deal o f pressure to win.
Athletics directors commonly felt that the stability o f their jobs and o f the coaches’jobs
depended on having winning programs. Boosters and alumni expect losing coaches to be
fired. On top o f that, one quarter o f the institutions that responded indicated that
athletics performance clauses that could cause the contracts to be non-renewed were
included in the contracts o f their coaches. An unavoidable question anses: W ill a coach
lose his job faster for cheating or for losing? This situation must be corrected if
institutional control o f athletics is to be successful.
The existence o f a strong board in control o f athletics could possibly help in
solving these paradoxes and the problems that face intercollegiate athletics leadership
today. Unfortunately, study responses indicated that the role of this board in a majoritv'
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o f institutions was not to establish policies or to make policy decisions; it was advisory
only. Changing this could be an effective starting place for institutions looking for ways
to improve their control o f athletics. Other recommendations follow.

Recommendations
The results o f this study suggest a number o f possible changes in policies,
procedures, and attitudes in order to improve the degree o f institutional control o f
athletics at N CA A Division I intercollegiate athletic institutions. These recommended
changes include:
1.

Governing boards o f all institutions should create a mission statement
concerning the role o f athletics and use it as a guideline for consistency.

2.

Governing boards, chief executive officers, and athletics directors should
reconsider their expectations and policies towards winning athletics
departments or programs. The study showed an alarming attitude on the
part o f boards, CEO's, and AD's that contributes to the pressure placed on
coaches to have winning programs. They should do their best to help
eliminate the b elief by athletics directors and coaches that the stability o f
their positions depends on having a winning program.

3.

Athletics performance clauses that could cause contracts to be nonrenewed should be eliminated: the attitude that a coach w ill be fired
quicker by having a losing program than by breaking NCAA rules is one
that should be eliminated.
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The governing board and chief executive officer should consider the
financial commitment given to the athletics program; the athletics
department should not have to rely on funds generated from boosters and
alumni. The level o f expectation for success should be determined by the
institution and funded accordingly.
•>

All institutions should eliminate special admission policies and standards
designed only for student athletes.

6.

The role o f the board in control o f athletics or o f the athletics advisory
board should be expanded to include policy decisions and the reviewing o f
all athletic administrative and coaching hires.

7.

External athletics support foundations be brought under the direct control
o f the institution.

Recommendations for Further Study
1.

It is recommended that a study be conducted to determine why the
majority o f athletics directors are directly supervised by the chief
e.xecutive officer.

2.

It IS recommended that a follow-up study be done concerning mission
statements defining the role o f intercollegiate athletics in order to
determine what these mission statements consist of. Also the number o f
institutions that do not have mission statements should be updated.
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3.

Il is recommended that a study be conducted to obtain more detailed
information about the expectations o f hav ing winning athletics programs
and the effects o f these expectations on athletics.

4.

It is recommended that a study be conducted on the reliance on external
flmding to finance the operation o f athletics departments in order to
identify ways that financial support can be generated without giv ing up
control and ways to generate loyalty based on the institution instead o f on
the success o f the athletics department.

5.

It is recommended that a study be done on the admission policies o f
institutions for student-athletes.

6.

It is recommended that a study be conducted to determine the reasons why
institutions have athletics performance clauses that could cause the
contracts o f coaches to be non-renewed: to determine exactly what these
clauses consist of: and to determine whether or not they promote a win-atall-costs attitude.
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A P P E N D IX I
S U R V E Y FOR C H IE F E X E C U T IV E OFHCERS

INSTRUCTIO NS: Following are statements regarding elanents of institutional control of
athletics that may or may not exist at your institiition. Please complete each question as
instructed. YO U R RESPONSES W IL L BE K E P T S T R IC T L Y C O N F ID E N T IA L .
I. Demographic Information
1.

Name of Institution:

2.

How many years have you been chief executive officer of this institution?

3.

Who is the direct supervisor of the athletics director and what position does he or
she hold?

4.

Has your institution ever been cited by the N C A A for a violation of
institutional control o f athletics during your term in office?
Y es__________ N o ___________

5.

What percentage of time do you devote for interacting with athletics
department persoimel concerning issues o f institutional control?
0%
10% 20%
30% 40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%

n . The Governing Board
6.

Does the governing board have a clear mission statement concerning
the role of athletics at your university. Y e s _________ N o _________

7.

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with
the following statements by checking the box under the heading that
best describe your feelings.

Strongly
UnStrongly
Agree Agree decided Disagree Disagree
The governing board o f your institution_________ ______
has a clearly articulated mission statement
concerning the authority o f the presidenL

____

The governing board is supportive o f
presidential authority at your university.
119

____

____

____

____

____
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The governing board o f your institution_________ ______
expects the athletics department to have
winning programs.

____

The governing board provides enough________________
financial support to your institution for
the athletics department to be self-sufficient

____

____

____

EH. Athletics Director
8.

Do the duties o f the athletics director include coaching responsibilities?
Y es ___________ N o ___________

9.

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with
the following statements by checking the box under the heading that
best describes your feelings.
Strongly
UnStrongly
Agree Agree deoded Disagree Disagree
The athletics director at your institution_________ ______
is supportive o f presidential authority.

____

The athletics director at yotnr institution
is conunitted to N C A A rules education
and compliance.

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

The athletics director at your institution_________ ______
agrees with the educational goals of the
school.

____

____

The athletics director at your institution________ ______
makes clear that he or she demands
compliance with N C A A rules and that
they w ill not tolerate those who deliberately
violate the rules or do so through gross
negligence.

____

____

The athletics director at your institution.
expects coaches to have winning programs.
The athletics director at your institution
believes the stability o f his or her
position depends on having wirming
programs.

IV . Athletics Department
10.

Does the athletics department at your institution have a full time compliance officer?
Y es___________N o ___________

11.

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following
statements by checking the box under the heading that best describes your feelings.
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Strongly
UnStrongly
Agree Agree decided Disagree Disagree
Coaches at your institution are
_
committed to N C A A rules compliance.
Football and Basketball coaches at
your institution believe the stability
o f their positions depend on having
a winning program.
Olympic coaches (Tennis, soccer, golf,_________ ______
etc.) at your institution believe the
stabniQr o f their positions depend on
having a winning program.

____

____

Coaches at your institution agree with
the educational goals of the school.

____

____

____

____

Coaches at you institution understand
and adhere to N C A A rules and
regulations.

____

____

____

____

Coaches have a clear understanding o f
their role within your university.

____

____

____

____

V . Alumni and Boosters
12.

Do external athletic foundations or booster organizations not under the direct control
o f your institution exist to support your institution’s athletic endeavors?
Y es__________ N o ___________

13.

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the
following statements by checking the box under the heading that best
describes your feelings.
Strongly
UnStrongly
Agree Agree dedded Disagree Disagree
Your athletics department relies a great
deal on funds generated from boosters
and alumni.

____

____

____

____

____

Boosters and alumni of your institution
are supportive o f presidential authoriQr.

____

____

____

____

____

Boosters and alimmi o f your institution
are committed to N C A A rules education
and compliance.

____

____

____

____

____

Boosters and alumni of your institution
expect the athletics department to have
winning programs.

____

____

____

____

____
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Strongly
UnStrongly
Agree Agree dedded Disagree Disagree

VI.

___
Boosters and alumni will not contribute
to your tmiversity unless you have wirming
athletics programs.

____ ____

____

___

Boosters and alumni of your institution
expect losing coaches to be fired.

___

____

___

___

____

Financial Information

14.

Does the athletic operating budget of your institution match the revenue generated?
Yes________ N o__________

15.

What percentage of the aimual athletics budget comes from institutional and/or state
funds?
0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

16.

Do foundations, whose control is external to the institution, provide
monetary support to the athletics program at your institution?
Yes________ No_________

17.

Does your institution conduct an independent financial audit of the
athletics department at least once a year? Yes________ No_______

18.

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the
following statements by checking the box under the heading that best
describes your feelings.

100%

Strongly
UnStrongly
Agree Agree dedded Disagree Disagree

Your institution provides enough financial support to the athletics department
to be considered self sufficient

___

Your athletics department relies a great
deal on funds generated from boosters
and alumni.

___

___

____

_

VH. The Institution
19.

Does your institution have a faculty athletics board?
Yes
No_____

20.

Is the role of the board in control of athletics or the athletics advisory
board at your institution to establish athletics policies and to make
policy decisions? Yes
No_____

21.

Is the role of the board in control of athletics or the athletics advisory
board of your school advisory only? Yes
No_____
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22.

Aie the coaching hires at your school reviewed by the Athletics
Advisory Board? Yes______N o______

23.

Does your institution have a clearly articulated mission statmnent
concerning the role of athletics? Yes_________ No__________

24.

Are all athletes expected to meet the same admission requirements as the general
student body? Yes_________ No__________
If no, how do the standards differ?

25.

What percentage of athletes are admitted to your institution under
different requirements as the general student body?
0%
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%

90%

100%

26.

Does your institution have an articulated set of goals concerning the
athletics program? Yes
No_____

27.

Has your institution conducted an external peer review of the athletics
program? Yes_______ No________

2 8.

Does your institution conduct a comprehensive self-study and evaluation of the
intercollegiate athletics programs at least once every five years? Yes_______
No_________

VUE. Institutional Control
29.

What is the greatest threat to institutional control of athletics at your institution?

30.

What methods have been used to lessen the impact of this threat on institutional
control?

31.

What percentage of institutional control over the athletics program do
you have at your institution?
0%
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
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32.

Please name three strategies that you have used to establish or
reestablish institutional control of athletics?
1.__________________________________________________________________________

2.

3._

33.

Please rank in order from a 1 for potentially the greatest threat to an 9 for the least
threat to institutional control of adiletics at your institution.
a. Governing Board ______
b. Alumni
_______
c. Boosters
_______
d. Coaches
______
e. AD of school
______
f. Professional agents______
g. NCAA
______
h. Student Athletes ______
i. Other
______

34.

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the
following statements by checking the box under the heading that best
describes your feelings.
Strongly
UnStrongly
Agree Agree decided Disagree Disagree

The chief executive officer at your
institution makes clear that he or
she demands compliance with
NCAA rules and üiat they will not
tolerate those who deliberately
violate the rules or do so through
gross negligence.
35.

___

___

____ ___

___

Is there any aspect regarding institutional control that you wish to add?
Comments______________________________________________
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APPENDIX n
SURVEY FOR ATHLETICS DIRECTORS

INSTRUCTIONS: Following are statements regarding elements of institutional control of
athletics that may or may not exist at your institution. Please complete each question as
instructed. YOUR RESPONSES WILL BE KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.
L Demographic Information
1.

Name of Institution:

2.

How many years have you been athletics director of this institution?

3.

Who is the direct supervisor of the athletics director and what position does he or
she hold?

4.

Has your institution been cited by the NCAA for a violation of institutional control
of athletics during your term in office? Yes_________ No__________

5.

What percentage of time do you devote with the chief executive
officer of your institution for issues of institutional control?
0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

n . The Governing Board
6.

Does the governing board have a mission statement concerning the role
of athletics at your university? Yes_________ No__________

125
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7.

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the
following statements by checking the box under the heading that best
describes your feelings.
The governing board of your institution
has a clearly articulated mission statement
concerning the authority of the president

Strongly
UnStrongly
Agtee Agree dedded Disagree Disagree

The governing board is supportive of
presidential authority at your institution.
The governing board of your institution
expects the athletics department to have
winning programs.

___

___

___

__

HL Athletics Director
8.

Do the duties of the athletics director include coaching responsibilities?
Yes_________ No__________

9.

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the
following statements by checking the box under the heading that best
describes your feelings.
Strongly
UnStrongly
Agree Agree dedded Disagree Disagree

The athletics director at your institution
is supportive of presidential authority.

____ ___

The athletics director at your institution
expects coaches to have winning programs
as the highest priority.

___

___

____ ____

____ ___

____ ____

The athletics director at your institution
___
believes the stability of his or her position
depends on having wirming athletics programs.

___

___

____ ____

The athletics director at your institution
___
makes clear that he or she demands
compliance with NCAA rules and that
they will not tolerate those who deliberately
violate the rules or do so through gross
negligence.

___

___

____ ____

rv . Athletics Department
10.

Does the athletics department at your institution have a full time NCAA compliance
officer? Yes_________ No__________

11.

Do the contracts of Football and Basketball coaches contain athletics performance
clauses that could cause the contracts to be non-renewed.
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12.

Do the contracts of Olympic sports coaches (Tennis, soccer, golf, etc.) contain
athletics performance clauses üiat could cause the contracts to be non-renewed.

13.

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the
following statements by checking the box under the heading that best
describes your feelings.
Strongly
Agree Agree

UnStrongly
«txiM Disagree Disagree

Coaches at your institution are commit
ted to NCAA rules compliance.
Your institution has a comprehensive
NCAA rules and regulations education
program for your a&letics departmenL
Your institution has a comprehensive mon
itoring program to ensure rules compliance.
Your institution identifies and reports to
the NCAA instances in which compliance
has not been achieved.
Football and Basketball coaches at your
institution believe the stabiliQ^ of their
positions depend on having a winning
program.
Olympic sports coaches (Tennis, soccer,
golf, etc.) at your institution believe
the stabili^ of their positions
depend on having a winning program.
Coaches at your institution agree with
the educational goals of the school
Coaches at your institution understand
and adhere to NCAA rules and regulations.
Informational and educational programs
have been established at your institution
to inform athletics boosters of the
limitations on their activities under
NCAA rules.
Informational and educational programs
are established at your institution for
student-athletes regarding the rules that
they must follow.
V. Alumni and Boosters
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14.

Do external athletic foundations or booster organizations not under the
direct control of your institution exist to support your institution’s
athletic endeavors? Yes__________ No_________

15.

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the
following statements by checking the box under the heading that best
describes your feelings.
Strongly
UnStrongly
Agtee Agree dedded DisagreeDisagree
Your athletics d^artment relies a great
deal on funds generated from boosters
and alumni.

____ ___

____ ____ ___

Boosters and alunmi of your institution
are supportive of presidential authority.

___

___

____ ____ ___

Boosters and alumni of your institution
are committed to NCAA rules education
and compliance.

___ ___

____ ____ ___

Boosters and alinnni of your institution
expect the athletics department to
have winning programs.

____ ___

____ ____ ___

Boosters and alumni wül not contribute
to your university unless you have
winning athletics programs.

___

___

____ ____ ___

Boosters and alunmi of your institution
expect coaches with losing records
to be fired.

___

___

____ ____ ___

VI. Financial Information
16.

Does the athletic operating budget of your institution match the revenue
generated? Yes__________ No_________

17 .

What percentage of the annual athletics budget comes from institutional
and/or state funds?
0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

18.

Do foundations, whose control is external to the institution, provide
monetary support to the athletics program at your institution?
Yes_________ N o_________

19.

Does your institution conduct an independent financial audit of the
athletics
department at least once a year?
Yes_________ N o__________

90%

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

100%

129

20.

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the
following statements by checking the box under the heading that best
describes your feelings.
Strongly
UnStrongly
Agree Agree dadffefl Disagree Disagree

Your institution provides enough financial support to the athletics department
to be considered self sufficient

____ ____ ____ ___

____

Your athletics department relies a great
deal on funds generated from
boosters and aliunni.

____ ___

____

____ ___

Vn. The Institution
2 1.

Does your institution have a board in control of athletics or an athletics
advisory board? Yes__________No__________

22.

Is the role of the board in control of athletics or the athletics advisory
board at your institution to establish athletics policies and to make policy decisions?
Y es__________N o_________

23.

Is the role of the board in control of athletics or the athletics advisory
board of your school advisory only? Yes__________No__________

24.

Are the coaching hires at your school reviewed by the board in control
of athletics or the athletics advisory board? Yes__________ No____

25.

Does your institution have a clearly articulated ntission statement
concerning the role of athletics? Yes__________No________

26.

Are athletes expected to meet the same adntission requirements as the
general student body? Yes_________ No__________
If no, how do the standards differ?

27.

What percentage of athletes are admitted to your institution under
different requirements as the general student body?
0%

28.
29.

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

Does your institution have an articulated set of goals concerning the
athletics program? Yes_________ No__________
Has your institution conducted an external peer review of the athletics
program? Yes__________No__________
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30.

Does your institution conduct a comprehensive self-study and
evaluation of the intercoUegiatB athletics programs at least once every
five years? Yes_________ No__________

V n i. Institutional Control
31.

What is the greatest threat to institutional control of athletics at your
institution?

32.

What methods have been used to lessen the impact of this threat on
institutional control?

3 3.

What percentage of institutional control over the athletics program do
you have at your institution?
0%

34.

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

Please name three strategies that you have used to establish or
reestablish institutional control of athletics?
1. ______________________________________

2.

3.
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35.

Please rank in order from a 1 for potentially the greatest threat to an 9
for the least threat to institutional control of athletics at your institution.
a. Governing Board _______
b. Alumni
_______
c. Boosters
_______
d. Coaches
_______
e. CEO of school
_______
f. Professional agents______
g. NCAA
_______
h. Student Athletes ______
i. Other__________ _______
Explain other:

36.

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the
following statements by checking the box under the heading that best
describes your feelings.
Strongly
IfoStrongly
Agree Agree dedded Disagree Disagree

The chief executive officer at your _
institution makes clear that he or she
demands compliance with NCAA rules
and that they will not tolerate those who
deliberately violate the rules or do so
through gross negligence.
37.

Is there any aspect regarding institutional control that you wish to add?
Comments____________________________________________________
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APPENDIX m
COVER LETTER TO CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS

Dear Sir or Madam:
As the chief executive officer of an NCAA Division I institution, you are being
asked to participate in a survey involving the institutional control of athletics. This
research will be used in my doctoral dissertation in Educational Leadership at the
University of Nevada, Las Vegas. The topic is "Institutional Control of Division I
Collegiate Athletics."
At present, the NCAA has developed specific guidelines for the proper institutional
control of college athletics. However, the NCAA and division I institutions do not
necessarily know the extent to which these guidelines of institutional control exist in
Division 1athletics today. Because of the emphasis placed on institutional control
of athletics by the NCAA, it is important to gauge its existence. Since the NCAA
has identified the chief executive officer as ± e responsible individual for
institutional control, the existence of institutional control is important to you.
ALL RESPONSES WILL BE KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL!
After completing the questiormaire, please return it in the enclosed self-addressed,
stamped envelope as soon as possible.
Thank you for your time in taking part in this study. Results will be available upon
completion of the research. 1 will be happy to send you a suirunary of the findings
upon your request
Sincerely,

Larry Easley
185 Webster Way
Henderson, NV 89014
132
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APPENDIX IV
COVER LETTER TO ATHLETICS DIRECTORS

Dear Sir or Madam:
As the athletics director of an NCAA Division I institution, you are being asked to
participate in a survey involving the institutional control of athletics. This research
will be used in my doctoral dissertation in Educational Leadership at the Urtiversity
of Nevada, Las Vegas. The topic is "Institutional Control of Division I Collegiate
Athletics."
At present, the NCAA has developed specific guidelines for the proper institutional
control of college athletics. However, the NCAA and division I institutions do not
necessarily know the extent to which these guidelines of institutional control exist in
Division I athletics today. Because of the emphasis placed on institutional control
of athletics by the NCAA, it is important to gauge its existence. Since the NCAA
has identified the chief executive officer as £ e responsible individual for
institutional control, the existence of institutional control is important to your
institution.
ALL RESPONSES WILL BE KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL!
After completing the questiormaire, please return it in the enclosed self-addressed,
stamped envelope as soon as possible.
Thank you for your time in taking part in this study. Results wiU be available upon
completion of the research. I will be happv to send vou a summarv of the findings
upon vour reouesL
Sincerely,

Larry Easley
185 Webster Way
Henderson, NV 89014
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APPENDIX V
FOLLOW-UP LETTER

Dear Sir or Madam:
I need your help!
Recently you received a questionnaire from me regarding "The Institutional Control
of Division I Athletics." The questiormaire is for my doctoral dissertation research.
According to my records, I have not yet received your response. Since a larger
number of replies adds to the significance of the study, I would like to get back as
many as possible.
ALL RESPONSES WILL BE KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL!
If you have returned your questionnaire, please disregard this letter and accept my
thanks and appreciation for taking time to participate. If you have misplaced it or it
simply slipped your mind, please complete it now and return it as soon as possible.
Another questionnaire and self-addressed, stamped envelope are included for you.
Thank you for your assistance!
Sincerely,
Larry Easley
185 Webster Way
Henderson, NV 89014
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